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Abstract 
This thesis reviews the behavioural effects of one of management accountings most extensively 
applied control tools: The performance appraisal. Employees are subject to performance 
appraisal on a regular basis, influencing perceptions of the employer, ourselves and our work 
life. It is on this perception we act, making appraisal a powerful tool. 
The adaption of social exchange theory and a multifoci perspective provides a relevant 
framework for the thesis, identifying several key variables of human behaviour. The research 
model presents four variables linked to performance appraisal. It is hypothesized that non-
financial performance measures in performance evaluation are positively associated with trust 
in the superior or with trust in the organization. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that this effect 
is mediated by perceptions of procedural and interactional justice; whether procedures and 
processes at work are fair and whether the interpersonal and informational treatment of the 
employee is fair, respectively. 
To examine the research questions, structural equation modelling and the statistical modelling 
tool LISREL is applied on a data sample gathered at a middle sized European real estate 
company. The survey and research design facilitates statistical analyses by examining 
individuals’ perceptions of the importance of financial and non-financial performance 
indicators, trust and justice. The results indicate that performance appraisal based on non-
financial performance indicators have a meaningful effect on employees’ trust in the 
organization and in the superior. Additionally, the indirect effect of non-financial performance 
indicators on justice is substantially larger than the effect of financial indicators, indicating that 
non-financial performance measures are perceived as more just. Finally, the results indicate that 
an alternative approach, where focus is shifted towards corporate strategy instead of financial 
and non-financial indicators, may be more appropriate in explaining the effects of performance 
appraisal on behaviour.  
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Sammendrag 
Denne avhandlingen har til hensikt å undersøke de atferdsmessige konsekvensene av et av de 
mest brukte kontrollverktøyene i økonomistyring – prestasjonsevaluering. Medarbeidere er 
underlagt prestasjonsevaluering på jevnlig basis, og det påvirker vår oppfattelse av blant annet 
arbeidsgiver, oss selv og arbeidslivet. Det er ut fra denne oppfattelsen vi handler, og det gjør 
prestasjonsevaluering til et kraftig verktøy. 
Anvendelsen av sosial bytteteori og et flerfokus-perspektiv legger til grunn et relevant 
rammeverk for avhandlingen, og identifiserer flere nøkkelvariabler i menneskelig atferd. 
Forskningsmodellen presenterer fire variabler koblet opp mot prestasjonsevaluering. Modellen 
undersøker om prestasjonsevaluering basert på ikke-økonomiske prestasjonsmål er positivt 
assosiert med tillit til nærmeste sjef eller tillit til organisasjonens toppledelse. Videre antas det 
at denne effekten er formidlet av medarbeideres oppfattelse av prosedyrerettferdighet og 
interaksjonell rettferdighet; henholdsvis om prosedyrer og prosesser i organisasjonen er 
rettferdige og om den mellommenneskelige- og informative behandlingen av medarbeidere er 
rettferdig. 
SEM-analyse og den statistiske programvaren LISREL er anvendt for å besvare 
problemstillingen. Utvalget er et mellomstort Europeisk eiendomsmeglerselskap. 
Spørreundersøkelsen og undersøkelsesdesignet tilrettelegger for statistiske analyser ved å 
undersøke medarbeideres oppfattelse av viktigheten av økonomiske og ikke-økonomiske 
prestasjonsmål, tillit og rettferdighet. De empiriske resultatene tyder på at prestasjonsevaluering 
basert på ikke-økonomiske prestasjonsmål har en meningsfylt effekt på medarbeideres tillit 
overfor organisasjonen og nærmeste sjef. Videre er den indirekte effekten av ikke-økonomiske 
prestasjonsmål markant større enn effekten av økonomiske prestasjonsmål, som kan tyde på at 
ikke-økonomiske prestasjonsmål oppfattes som mer rettferdig. Til slutt antyder resultatene at 
en alternativ tilnærming, hvor fokuset endres fra økonomiske og ikke-økonomiske 
prestasjonsmål til strategi og visjon, bedre kan forklare hvordan prestasjonsevaluering påvirker 
atferd.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This thesis is a study of the importance of non-financial performance indicators in performance 
appraisal with respect to individuals’ perceived justice1 and the quality of social exchange 
relationships (defined in this thesis as trust in superior2 and trust in organization). The research 
focus is on perceptions of justice, trust and the perceived importance of non-financial indicators 
used in performance appraisal. The theoretical framework for the thesis is social exchange 
theory. This thesis is inspired by the article Financial and nonfinancial performance measures: 
How do they affect job satisfaction? by Chong Lau and Mahfud Sholihin (2005). First, 
background to the research is postulated, followed by the objectives of the study and the 
research problem. Then the contributions offered by this study are reviewed, and, finally, the 
structure of the thesis is explained. 
1.1 Background to the research 
The paramount question for the management of any organization is how well are we doing? 
(Fitzgerald, 2007). The answer to this question is generally achieved through performance 
evaluation, almost ubiquitous in one form or another in corporations. The proliferation of 
performance measurement controls may be due to the fact that measurement-managed 
organizations perform better than non-measurement-managed organizations (Fitzgerald, 2007). 
Performance measurement is traditionally financially oriented; however, the last decades of 
management accounting developments have advocated the inclusion of non-financial 
performance measures in performance measurement controls. Critics of financial performance 
measures uphold that they fail to capture customer quality and the innovation demands required 
by a competitive environment (Fitzgerald, 2007). In contrast, non-financial performance 
measures are closely linked to corporate strategy and recognizes the gamut of the organization’s 
operations (Fitzgerald, 2007). 
Management accounting controls should engender positive attitudes and behaviour (Merchant 
and Van Der Stede, 2011). It is argued that non-financial performance measures take 
employees’ concerns and interests into consideration (Lau and Moser, 2008). Naturally, 
employees’ emphasizes conditions beneficial to them. A fair evaluation process, which 
                                                 
1 Justice and fairness are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
2 Superior and supervisor are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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determines remuneration and recognition, is vital. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
employees’ are sensitive to how the performance evaluation procedures are designed, and how 
the process is handled.  In this regard, the fairness of the performance evaluation is an important 
determinant of behaviour, where an expected result is a relationship between employee and 
employer characterized by trust. Employees who are willing to trust engage in better task 
performance, perform more citizenship behaviours and commit less counterproductive 
behaviour (Colquitt et al., 2007). 
An interesting distinction is in whom one trusts. Whether an employee develops trust in his or 
her direct superior or in the general leadership of the organization may have different 
consequences (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). It signifies whether the employees recognize fair 
treatment by the supervisor or the organization with respect to outcome, procedures and 
interaction. This line of reasoning begets questions: Do trust relationships vary according to 
whether the trustee is the superior or the organization? Do the relationship between justice 
perceptions and trust depend on who is seen as accountable? The dogmas of performance 
measurement is rapidly evolving; survey data indicate that between 40 per cent and 60 per cent 
of organizations significantly altered their performance measurement systems between just 
1995 and 2000 (Fitzgerald, 2007). Finding answers to the above questions is part of the key to 
developing accurate performance measurement controls, which in turn help the organizations 
answer the pervading question how well are we doing? 
 
Figure 1: Research model 
Performance
indicators
(NFI versus FI)
Procedural
justice
Interactional
justice
Trust in 
organization
Trust in 
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A
B
C
D
E
F
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1.2 Objectives of the study 
Through a survey in a medium-sized European real estate company, I look at the use of 
performance indicators and how they relate to perceptions of organizational justice, supervisor-
focused trust and organization-focused trust (see figure 1). The relationships between the 
variables are uncovered through structural equation modelling, a flexible approach appropriate 
for testing models and theory. This approach relies on strong statistical data and a large sample; 
however, this is difficult to achieve in practice, and thus limits the results of the analysis. The 
main objective of this study is to examine whether an appraisal system based on non-financial 
performance indicators positively associate with employees’ level of trust, thereby achieving 
wanted organizational outcomes. Specifically, the thesis aims to elucidate: 
1. Whether the use of non-financial performance indicators in performance appraisal is 
perceived as fair; and 
2. whether perceived fairness is positively associated with trust in superior or trust in 
organization. 
1.3 Research problem 
This thesis answers the following research problem: 
Are fair perceptions of performance evaluation associated with trust in superior or in 
organization? 
The research problem is relatively broad in nature; however, the focus of this thesis is narrow. 
Performance evaluation, justice and trust are complex constructs, spanning several variables, 
antecedents, theories, models etc. This thesis examines only a miniscule part of extant literature 
and research, focusing on non-financial indicators for performance evaluation, perceptions of 
procedural and interactional justice and trust in superior and organization, grounded in a 
multifoci perspective. Focusing on multifoci justice and trust facilitates deeper insight regarding 
these variables. The following research sub questions are addressed: 
- Is the effect on target similar variables stronger than the effect on target dissimilar 
variables? 
- Is trust in superior and in organization mediated by perceptions of fairness? 
- Is non-financial performance measures perceived as more just than financial 
performance measures in performance appraisal procedures? 
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Answering these questions illuminates aspects of some of the core questions in organizational 
justice research identified by Crawshaw et al. (2013). It addresses the consequences of injustice 
with respect to trust levels and how non-financial performance measures in performance 
evaluation are an antecedent to justice perceptions. 
1.4 Contributions of the research 
First, this study contributes insight on performance appraisal systems. This study illuminates 
how the use of performance indicators in performance evaluation affects levels of trust. 
Depending on the desired organizational outcomes of implementation of an appraisal system, 
inclusion of non-financial indicators might therefore be appropriate. Second, it adds to the 
knowledge of bleeding edge justice research. By adapting a multifoci perspective, this thesis 
lucubrates how supervisor-focused and organization-focused perceptions of justice affects the 
employees’ level of trust, respectively towards the organization and the superior. Lastly, but 
not least, because this thesis employs established instruments it facilitates comparison with 
prior research. 
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
This thesis is structured to provide a review of relevant information regarding fairness 
perceptions of performance measurement, organizational justice and trust. Chapter 2 provides 
the theoretical framework explaining how perceptions of fairness affect behaviour. Chapter 3 
provides a review of extant research and the relevant theoretical constructs, and formulation of 
the hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the methods applied and substantiates choices made. In 
chapter 5, the results from the statistical analysis are presented, and model fit, reliability and 
construct validity are discussed. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the research question with 
respect to theory, previous literature and the empirical results, and offers a conclusion. 
Additionally, an alternative model and different approach to the performance measurement 
instrument is reviewed. Finally, chapter 7 presents limitations afflicting the study and provides 
suggestions for future research.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
Traditional emphasis on organizational justice research has been to demonstrate and highlight 
the strength and resilience of the link between justice and organizational behaviour. However, 
it has failed to explain why and how justice has such a powerful effect on workers’ behaviour 
(Tyler and Blader, 2005). The theoretical link between justice and behaviour has of late received 
a great deal of attention in justice literature. Theories like the control model, social exchange 
theory, relational models of justice, fairness theory and fairness heuristic theory argues how 
justice perceptions are formed, and aim to elucidate why and how justice can have such a strong 
effect on behaviour (Colquitt et al., 2013). A common thread to the theories is that they link 
people’s reactions to justice with their desire to attain valuable outcomes from the organization 
(Tyler and Blader, 2005). This chapter sets the theoretical foundation for the thesis, relying on 
social exchange theory to explain how justice and behaviour connects. 
2.1 Social exchange theory 
Social exchange theory is a multidisciplinary paradigm with the potential to provide a unitary 
framework for organizational behaviour (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Within the context 
of organizational justice it is adapted to help understand the link between justice and behaviour 
(Tyler and Blader, 2005). The theory argues that the impact of justice perceptions on behaviour 
is mediated by the transaction of resources following certain rules. 
One of the basic dogmas of social exchange theory is that relationships evolve over time into 
loyal, trusting and mutual commitments. In order for this to happen, parties must follow specific 
rules of exchange. The rules and norms functions as guidelines of exchange processes 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Emerson (1976) defines the rules of exchange as ‘normative 
definitions of the situation that emerge between exchange participants’ and can range from 
competition to reciprocity to altruism (Colquitt et al., 2013, p. 200). Reciprocity is the best-
known exchange rule, and the focus of justice research and this thesis3. Reciprocity is defined 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that other exchange rules (such as rationality, altruism, group gain, status consistency and 
competition) may explain important aspects of social exchange, and little research has been devoted to the 
possibility that multiple rules are employed simultaneously (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Consequently, 
focusing on only reciprocity and excluding other important notions of exchange provides a limited framework. 
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by Gouldner (1960) as ‘a universal norm demanding that people should help (and refrain from 
injuring) those who help them’ (Colquitt et al., 2013, p. 201).  Three types of reciprocity are 
delineated: Reciprocity as interdependent exchanges, reciprocity as a folk belief and reciprocity 
as a moral norm (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). 
Reciprocity as interdependent exchanges involves mutual and complementary arrangements; 
something has to be given and something returned. Reciprocal interdependence emphasizes 
interpersonal transactions, whereby an action by a party fosters a response by a second party 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). The exchange process starts when a participant makes a 
move, expecting reciprocation. If the action is reciprocated, new rounds of exchange follows. 
Once the process is in motion, each action and repayment can create a self-reinforcing 
continuous cycle. Because the cycle of actions depend on the participants behaviour, 
interdependence reduces risk and encourages cooperation (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). 
Following this definition, social exchange theory purposely omits bargaining. Reciprocity, as 
opposed to bargaining, begets better work relationships allowing individuals to be more trusting 
of, and committed to, each other (Molm et al., 2000). Reciprocity as a folk belief revolves 
around the tenet that “people get what they deserve” (Gouldner, 1960). This expectation shares 
fundamental principles with the notion of karma, where, over time, all exchanges reach a fair 
equilibrium (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Reciprocity as a moral norm describes how 
participants ought to behave, and how participants following the norm are obligated to behave 
reciprocally (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). However, it is important to note that a universal 
moral norm does not exist; individuals and cultures have disparate values of reciprocity. 
Exchange ideology – whether an individual is likely to favourably return a good deed – affects 
attitudes and behaviour (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). 
Resources are widely defined in social exchange 
theory, and may be anything transacted in an 
intra or interorganizational context (Tyler and 
Blader, 2005). Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) 
categorize exchange resources as love, status, 
information, money, goods and services, creating 
a two-dimensional matrix with particularism 
(versus universalism) along one axis and 
concrete resources (versus symbolic resources) 
along the other. Particularistic resources have 
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high provider relevance (e.g. love), while universal resources have low provider relevance (e.g. 
money). Symbolic resources, such as love, convey meaning that surpasses the objective worth. 
Concrete resources, on the other hand, are tangible and have objective worth (Colquitt et al., 
2013; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) further proposed that 
different resources are exchanged in different ways. Benefits that are particularistic and 
symbolic are usually exchanged in a diffuse and unconstrained manner, while universal, 
concrete resources are exchanged in a quid pro quo fashion (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). 
2.2 The social exchange model of workplace relations 
The social exchange model of workplace relations (Shore et al., 2004) has garnered the most 
research attention. This model assumes that specific workplace antecedents lead to 
interpersonal connections, termed social exchange relationships. Social exchange theory 
stipulates that social exchange relationships are characterized by reciprocal obligations between 
the parties. The theory posits that employees regard certain resources as a benefit worthy of 
reciprocation. Therefore, transaction of resources begets an obligation on the part of the 
employee to reciprocate, fostering the development and maintenance of a social exchange 
relationship (Tyler and Blader, 2005; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Social exchange 
relationships are a mediator or an intervening variable; beneficial and fair transactions between 
strong relationships prompt these relationships to produce effective work behaviour and 
positive employee attitudes (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Social exchange relationships 
lead to the exchange of valued benefits between individuals, and thus employees will be hesitant 
to neglect to reciprocate in fear of losing said benefits. Employee reciprocation could be in the 
form of cooperation or positive attitudes toward the superior or organization, thus explaining 
why and how justice affects organizational behaviour (Tyler and Blader, 2005). 
Fairness reflects the sort of symbolic resource that should foster reciprocative actions (Colquitt 
et al., 2013). The operative question then becomes how to capture the relationship between 
justice and reciprocative behaviours – a relationship born through social exchange. Cropanzano 
and Byrne (2000) noted that any intervening variable needs to capture the dynamics at play in 
social exchange relationships while also being able to easily adapt to multiple foci (e.g., 
supervisor and organization). The authors identified five possible constructs that meet the 
requirements, namely trust, commitment, leader-member exchange, support and psychological 
contracts. Each construct taps into different aspects of the relationship, and there are important 
differences between them. However, with respect to justice research, Cropanzano and Byrne 
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argues that the differences are less significant than the similarities between the constructs 
(Colquitt et al., 2013). Colquitt et al. (2012) demonstrated how the identified variables were 
interchangeable; they affect organizational outcomes similarly. This thesis focuses on trust. 
Commitment, psychological contracts, support and leader-member exchange have therefore 
been omitted from the subsequent discussion. Colquitt et al. (2013), in their meta-analytic 
review, corroborates that trust is an indicator of the quality of the social exchange in an 
interpersonal relationship. Additionally, the work of Molm (2000, 2003) demonstrates that 
relationships characterized by trust develop from successful reciprocal exchanges. High levels 
of trust indicates a high quality social exchange relationship characterized by valued 
transactions. Trust mediate the outcomes of justice, such as performance, organizational 
citizenship behaviour and job satisfaction (Colquitt et al., 2007). 
One of the first studies to utilize social exchange theory within the context of organizational 
justice was Folger and Konovsky’s examination of the antecedents of organizational citizenship 
behaviour (Folger and Konovsky, 1989). The authors based their arguments on Blau’s (1964) 
discussion on social versus economic exchange. Blau (1964) proposed that social exchange 
“involves favors that create diffuse future obligations . . . and the nature of the return cannot be 
bargained” (p. 93) and that “only social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal 
obligations, gratitude, and trust; purely economic exchange as such does not” (p. 94). Folger 
and Konovsky thus speculated that fairness was able to foster a social exchange relationship 
(Folger and Konovsky, 1989). Moorman (1991) likewise argued that fair treatment would cause 
employees to redefine their working relationship as one of social exchange (Colquitt et al., 
2013). These early applications of social exchange theory gave rise to what has been termed 
contemporary social exchange theory (Colquitt et al., 2013). 
2.3 Contemporary social exchange theory 
Contemporary social exchange theory focuses solely on social exchange in an interpersonal 
relationship, as opposed to the multidimensional social exchange theory. By resources, the 
prevailing focus is on symbolic and particularistic resources, such as justice, while reciprocity 
is the dominant exchange rule (Colquitt et al., 2013). Contemporary social exchange theory 
explicates why beneficial actions on the part of supervisors and organizations might foster 
beneficial actions on the part of employees in an organizational setting. 
The focus on a specific exchange partner, derived from the original social exchange theorizing, 
influenced the early wave of contemporary social exchange theorizing. For instance, it was 
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argued that if a supervisor increased an employee’s wage, the employee would reciprocate 
towards the supervisor. However, this simplistic application of social exchange theory tended 
to obnubilate important complexities. Organ and Konovsky (1989) linked cognitions about pay 
to organizational citizenship behaviour targeted towards the organization, towards the 
supervisor and towards co-workers. The authors’ measure of pay cognition did not refer to the 
supervisor’s role in determining pay, thus creating uncertainty as to whether the supervisor was 
a valid target for reciprocation. Furthermore, there was no reason to suspect that co-workers 
had any influence on pay levels, yet it was demonstrated that increased pay level resulted in 
reciprocative actions towards co-workers (Colquitt et al., 2013). Subsequent justice researchers 
began to hypothesize that relationships between justice variables and reciprocative outcomes 
were moderated by the focus of the justice; e.g. that supervisor-focused interactional justice 
would predict trust in superior more strongly than trust in organization (Aryee et al., 2002; 
Erdogan et al., 2006; Kernan and Hanges, 2002; Masterson et al., 2000; Tekleab et al., 2005; 
Wayne et al., 2002). The chapter on multifoci justice (3.1.4) ventures deeper into this aspect of 
social exchange theory.  
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3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
This chapter documents relevant literature and previous findings in management accounting 
research. Based on the theoretical framework of social exchange theory and drawing on 
previous research and findings, hypotheses are developed. The chapter is organized 
accordingly: First, the concept of organizational justice is reviewed, explaining distributive, 
procedural, interactional, and multifoci justice. The second section examines how non-financial 
performance measures relate to perceptions of justice. Third, the relationship between 
procedural and interactional justice is discussed. Fourth, the concept of trust in superior and 
trust in organization is explained. The final section reviews how perceptions of justice relate to 
trust. 
3.1 Organizational justice 
The concept of justice is ancient; however, the last half-century justice has experienced a 
proliferation of attention, especially organizational justice. Employees’ concerns with 
organizational justice are reflected through a myriad of everyday work aspects. First, employees 
care about their wages, promotions, rewards and the distribution of outcome. This is known as 
distributive justice (Cropanzano et al., 2002). Second, workers are concerned with the fairness 
of the procedures, processes or decision-making resulting in allocation or distribution of 
outcome, and with understanding why or how they came about. This is known as procedural 
justice (Cropanzano et al., 2002). Third, employees are concerned with the interpersonal 
treatment between parties in an organization, especially key authorities. This is known as 
interpersonal justice (Cropanzano et al., 2002). Finally, individuals care about the explanations 
provided conveying information as to why certain procedures were used or why outcomes were 
distributed in a certain way. This is known as informational justice (Cropanzano et al., 2002). 
Interpersonal and informational justice operates under the umbrella term interactional justice, 
which is the term applied in this thesis. Collectively, these four aspects are known as 
organizational justice, although the facets in and of themselves are conceptually unique 
elements (Colquitt et al., 2001; Colquitt et al., 2013). This conceptualization of justice focuses 
on how individuals perceive justice, and not justice as it objectively should be. Thus, 
understanding justice requires an understanding of what people deem to be fair (Colquitt et al., 
2005).  
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3.1.1 Distributive justice 
During the distributive justice wave (1950s through the 1970s), justice was equivalent with 
distributive justice (i.e., whether the allocation or distribution of outcome is fair). Distributive 
justice proposes that relative satisfaction is explained by fair or unfair distribution of resources 
within interpersonal relationships. Individuals are not concerned with the absolute level of 
outcome, but rather whether the outcome is fair considering their contribution (Adams, 1965). 
Distributive justice focuses solely on outcomes. Allocation rules of equity, equality and need 
exist (Rupp et al., 2014), but they all share a common denominator in that the ultimate goal is 
distributive justice (Colquitt et al., 2001). 
3.1.2 Procedural justice 
The term procedural fairness was initially used by Thibaut and Walker (1975). They researched 
third-party dispute resolution procedures within a legal setting. They found that people were 
willing to give up control regarding the final decision, as long as they retained control in the 
process stage, i.e. sufficient time to develop a case and collect evidence. In other words, they 
found that perceptions of procedural fairness affect satisfaction with the outcome. Based on 
these findings, Thibaut and Walker (1978) proposed that procedures in accordance with 
societal, and not objective, criteria of fairness should be utilized. The theory elucidates how 
societal fairness criteria is situation specific, and thus, that different procedures are necessary 
to resolve different disputes (Sholihin and Pike, 2009). 
Leventhal and his colleagues refined Thibaut and Walker’s research. They orchestrated the 
transfer of procedural justice from the legal to the organizational setting, and expanded the 
criteria necessary to achieve a fair process. Procedures should (a) be applied consistently across 
people and across time, (b) be unbiased, (c) ensure that accurate information is utilized in 
decision-making, (d) be able to correct inaccurate decisions, (e) conform to personal and 
prevailing standards of ethics or morality and (f) ensure that the opinion of every group affected 
by the decision is taken into consideration (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980). 
3.1.3 Interactional justice 
It was not until Bies and Moag (1986) analysed fairness of interpersonal communication that 
interactional justice received serious attention. For an extended period, it was uncertain whether 
interactional justice was a facet of procedural justice, or an independent justice dimension 
(Colquitt et al., 2005). Moorman (1991) conceptualized interactional justice as an independent 
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justice element separate from procedural justice, and he created the first widely used 
measurement instrument used to capture the phenomenon. Greenberg (1993) argued that 
interactional justice comprised two unique aspects: interpersonal justice and informational 
justice. A meta-analysis by Colquitt et al. (2001) inferred that the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and informational justice is as strong as the relationship between 
distributive justice and procedural justice – two components literature agrees are empirically 
and conceptually distinct. Consequently, four unique justice dimensions exist, each adding 
incremental value to the concept of justice. 
3.1.4 Multifoci justice 
An emerging trend in organizational justice research is multifoci justice. This trend is based on 
social exchange theory (Rupp et al., 2014) and posits that individuals consider the different 
“types” of justice (i.e., distributive, procedural and interactional) as well as the source of the 
situation perceived as fair or unfair. The concepts of distributive, procedural and interactional 
justice emerged from multiple disciplines and across several decades. And, despite being 
commonly treated this way, outcomes, procedures and interaction were not theorized as 
perceptual targets. Rather, they were labels for a set of normative rules used by perceivers to 
arrive at justice perceptions. Each set of rules was developed in chronological order, and was 
argued to mitigate the effect of the current dominant justice construct. Distributive justice 
effects were moderated by procedural justice, while procedural justice effects were moderated 
by interactional justice (Rupp et al., 2014). In other words, perceptions of for example 
distributive injustice lessened if the individual perceived procedural justice. Colquitt and 
colleagues (2001) noted that the type-based justice measures are employees’ reports on whether 
the normative rules are violated or not (Rupp et al., 2014). Ambrose and Arnaud (2005) noted 
that outcomes, procedures and interactions do not constitute perceptual targets, but rather 
theoretical rules individuals apply to evaluate their working conditions. The multifoci 
perspective, therefore, posits that asking whether the normative rules are upheld or violated 
without reference to a “face” – a particular party held responsible – is missing an important 
piece of the phenomenon. The three sets of justice rules thus constitutes one piece of the justice 
perception formation process whereby a focal party is considered fair or unfair based on 
whether the normative rules are upheld or violated (Rupp et al., 2014). 
Accountability is a dominant feature in multifoci justice, relating to individuals targeted 
reactions toward transgressors of the set of rules. Justice perceptions concerning a specific party 
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are expected to spur behavioural and attitudinal reactions directed specifically at that party 
(Rupp et al., 2014). It is argued that procedural justice reflects how the organization allocates 
resources. Because it reflects the organization as an entity, procedural justice should be related 
to cognitive, affective and behavioural reactions toward the organization or those leading the 
organization, i.e. top management. Thus, procedural justice is organization-focused (Cohen-
Charash and Spector, 2001). Interactional justice comprises elements of interpersonal 
behaviour of top management’s representatives and information conveyed by the 
representatives. Top management’s representatives are often the employee’s supervisor. 
Consequently, interactional justice should relate to employees’ cognitive, affective and 
behavioural reactions towards their superior; it is supervisor-focused (Cohen-Charash and 
Spector, 2001). The term target similarity refer to the alignment of justice source with the 
“appropriate” response target, while target dissimilarity or bandwidth fidelity refer to the 
misalignment of justice source and response target (Lavelle et al., 2007). Early research 
proposed that the organization would be the implied focal party responsible for procedural 
justice, while the supervisor would be the implied focal party responsible for interactional 
justice (Rupp et al., 2014). Some support exists for these predictions (Rupp et al., 2014; 
Cropanzano et al., 2002; e.g., Masterson et al., 2000). However, subsequent research 
demonstrates that supervisory procedural justice and organizational interactional justice exists, 
as supervisors often develop and utilize their own decision-making procedures and employees’ 
anthropomorphize the organization (Lavelle et al., 2007). Thus, employees can judge the 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice of any one party, as long as the employee has 
reason to believe that the party in question is responsible for the situation (Lavelle et al., 2007). 
The organization, superior, co-workers and customers are parties normally identified as sources 
of justice (Lavelle et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2013; Rupp et al., 2014). This thesis focuses on 
employees’ level of trust in superior and organization. Previous research has linked procedural 
justice with trust in superior (Sholihin and Pike, 2009; Lau et al., 2008; Lau and Sholihin, 2005), 
two target dissimilar variables. Researching target similar variables facilitates the use of 
multifoci research grounded in social exchange theory, allowing hypothesizing concerning the 
links between key employee perceptions (justice and non-financial performance indicators) and 
trust to be made with more precision by specifying foci of the psychological process being 
investigated (Lavelle et al., 2007). 
In conclusion, multifoci justice draws upon social exchange theory to argue that despite the 
proliferation of justice rules (i.e., distributive, procedural, interactional), individuals seek to 
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hold some party accountable for the transgression or maintenance of the rules, and it is these 
parties (e.g., superior, organization) that are the recipients of attitudes and behaviours (Rupp et 
al., 2014). 
3.2 Non-financial performance measures 
Up until the 1980s, the performance measurement literature focused mainly on traditional 
financial performance measures, such as productivity, profit and return on investment 
(Ghalayini et al., 1997). However, in the early 1980s, performance measurement literature 
started evolving to capture the complex and competitive global market (Taticchi et al., 2010). 
Managers and employees in these companies needed measures with predictive power, as well 
as historical financial data (Neely, 1999). Financial measures are criticised of being too late, 
too aggregated, historical in nature, short-term, incomplete and one-dimensional (Kaplan, 1984; 
Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Lynch and Cross, 1991). On the other hand, a study by Ittner et al. 
(2003) demonstrates how companies believe non-financial indicators are associated with 
several benefits, such as depicting the state of the business before financial metrics are released 
and providing superior information about the necessary actions needed to achieve strategic 
objectives. 
Performance indicators, whether financial and/or non-financial, are often employed in 
performance appraisal of employees, which in turn affects employee compensation and reward 
(Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). Furthermore, performance appraisals also reflect the employees’ 
success or failure, affecting intrinsic values, such as self-confidence and self-esteem (Kaplan 
and Atkinson, 1998). It is therefore natural that employees express concern regarding the design 
of the appraisal system. 
3.3 Non-financial performance measures and organizational justice (link A and B) 
Whether financial, non-financial or a combination of both indicators are used to evaluate 
employee performance are important determinants for employees’ perceived fairness. 
Consequently, the design of the appraisal system is vital, as it affects the perceived fairness of 
the evaluation process. In the context of performance appraisal, the evaluation process is 
considered fair if it: (1) leads to performance appraisals based on complete and accurate 
information; (2) reflects the employees’ long-term interest; (3) enables appeals against and 
rectification of unfair appraisals; (4) reflects performance within the employees’ control; (5) 
protects the employees’ interests; and (6) facilitates polite and dignified treatment of the 
employees (Lau and Moser, 2008; Leventhal, 1980). Inclusion of non-financial indicators may 
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address these criteria. They are broad, varied, long-term, cause-focused and experienced as 
relevant and meaningful (Lau and Sholihin, 2005; Lau and Moser, 2008). They allow multiple 
aspects, both tangible and intangible, of the employees’ performance to be recognized in the 
evaluation process, ensuring accurate reflection of effort (Lau and Sholihin, 2005; Lau and 
Moser, 2008). Furthermore, non-financial indicators are unconstrained by time, whereas 
financial indicators depends on e.g. quarterly reports (Lau and Moser, 2008; Lau and Sholihin, 
2005). Finally, non-financial indicators may provide a better sense of control of the evaluation 
process; appraisals based on non-financial indicators are subject to flexible interpretations, and 
subordinates may therefore be in a better position to seek explanations or provide their own 
interpretations, reducing the chance of unfair appraisals (Lau and Moser, 2008; Thibaut and 
Walker, 1975). Employees with the possibility to discuss indicators with their superior might 
infer enhanced interactional justice. 
Following this reasoning, the adoption of non-financial indicators should be associated with 
enhanced perceptions of fairness, both procedural and interactional. The following hypotheses 
arise: 
H1a Non-financial performance-based evaluation is positively associated with interactional 
justice. 
H1b Non-financial performance-based evaluation is positively associated with procedural 
justice. 
3.4 Procedural justice and interactional justice (link C) 
As evident by the research of Moorman (1991) and early justice research, there is a correlation 
between procedural and interactional justice; it took years before interactional justice was 
established as a unique facet of organizational justice (Colquitt et al., 2005). Colquitt et al. 
(2001) established that the concepts are distinct, and that interactional justice comprises both 
interpersonal and informational justice. However, considering how superiors create their own 
procedures and employees’ attribute human characteristics to the organization (Lavelle et al., 
2007), it is assumed that interactional and procedural justice, despite being empirically distinct 
justice dimensions, still affect each other. If a superior creates personal procedures that affects 
his or her subordinates, it is natural to assume that statements such as “procedures are designed 
to provide useful feedback regarding the decision and its implementation” (a procedural justice 
statement used in this study) could be strongly linked to statements like “my supervisor provides 
me with timely feedback about decisions and their implications” (an interactional justice 
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statement used in this study). Both questions could refer to the superior in the mind of the 
employee. Additionally, if employees regard the organization as an entity with human 
characteristics, the difference between organization and superior might be diminished, which 
might create strong similarities between procedural and interactional justice. Consequently, the 
following hypothesis arises: 
H2 The relationship between procedural and interactional justice is simultaneous. 
Procedural justice and interactional justice positively correlate. 
3.5 Trust 
Trust has attracted much research attention among management accounting studies (Lau and 
Sholihin, 2005). Trust has been defined in numerous ways, yet two key elements recur: Positive 
expectations of trustworthiness and willingness to accept vulnerability to a trustee irrespective 
of the ability to control the trustee’s actions (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Furthermore, Fulmer 
and Gelfand (2012) argue there are distinctions between trust at a level and in a referent. 
Organizations are multilevel entities, and trust operates at the individual, team, and 
organizational level. This thesis examines trust at the individual level; it is the employees’ 
perceptions of trust that is important in determining consequences of performance appraisal. 
Trust in a referent refers to the target of the trust. The superior and the organization are two of 
several possible targets (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Trust in superior or organization does not 
equal a general propensity to trust in that the former is directed towards a specific target while 
the latter concerns people in general (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Trust at the individual level 
is therefore viewed as ‘a personal belief about the degree to which a particular referent is 
trustworthy and to which one is willing to accept vulnerability vis-à-vis this referent’ (Fulmer 
and Gelfand, 2012, p. 1174). This interpretation of trust fits well within social exchange theory; 
there is no way to ensure an appropriate return for a favour, and thus social exchange requires 
trusting others to fulfil their obligations (Blau, 1964). Trust consequently operates as a mediator 
of the quality of the social exchange relationship. 
Considerable extant empirical data suggests a positive relationship between perceived fairness 
and trust (e.g., Staley and Magner, 2007; Magner and Welker, 1994; Magner et al., 1995; Lau 
and Sholihin, 2005; Lau and Tan, 2006; Lau et al., 2008; Sholihin and Pike, 2009). On the one 
hand, it should be noted that these studies fail to address the complexity of the trust construct, 
usually linking procedural justice to trust in superior without further elaboration. On the other 
hand, the studies found significant effects between procedural justice and trust in superior, two 
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target dissimilar variables. These findings indicate a strong relationship between perceptions of 
justice and trust. 
3.6 Procedural justice and trust in organization (link D) 
Employees are concerned with the fairness of the procedures, processes or decision-making 
resulting in allocation or distribution of outcome, and with understanding why or how they 
came about. Performance appraisal procedures are usually linked to remunerations and rewards. 
Consequently, it constitutes an important aspect of the employees’ job, and it is expected to be 
executed fairly. When procedural justice is perceived, employees positively reciprocate (e.g., 
by harbouring favourable attitudes, such as trust (Lau and Sholihin, 2005)) towards the source 
of the perceived fairness (Colquitt et al., 2013). Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) argue that 
procedural justice is organization-focused; it concerns procedures implemented by the 
organization as an entity. Performance appraisal procedures are implemented across the entirety 
of the organization, and it is enacted by top management. Therefore, it is expected that 
performance appraisal procedures primarily affect the employees’ trust in the organization. 
Procedural justice and trust in organization are target similar variables (Rupp et al. 2014). Based 
on the above discussion, the following hypothesis arises: 
H3 Procedural justice is positively associated with trust in organization. 
3.7 Interactional justice and trust in superior (link E) 
According to Lau and Moser (2008), fair procedures are associated with respectful and dignified 
treatment. Additionally, Ilgen et al. (1979) proposed that perceptions of feedback depend on the 
message received, but also on the individual conveying the message (the rater). The superior 
inhabits the role of rater when discussing performance with subordinates, and research have 
demonstrated how the rater is in a position to influence reactions to performance appraisal 
(Cederblom, 1982; Klein et al., 1987). Nathan et al. (1991) and Pooyan and Eberhardt (1989) 
asserted that superiors play a critical role in the success or failure of appraisal systems. In 
accordance with this line of reasoning, it is expected that interpersonal treatment and accurate 
information will affect behaviour targeted towards the superior (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 
2001). Subordinates are likely to perceive fair treatment by superiors who convey truthful and 
accurate information in a respectful and considerate manner. Based on target similarity and the 
above discussion, it is hypothesized that interactional justice will be associated with trust in 
superior. 
18 
 
H4 Interactional justice is positively associated with trust in superior. 
3.8 Spillover effects (link F) 
One the one hand, it is expected that target similar effects have greater effects than target 
dissimilar effects (Rupp et al., 2014): That perceptions of fair performance appraisal procedures 
will be reciprocated towards the organization, while perceptions of fair interaction during the 
performance appraisal process will be reciprocated towards the superior. On the other hand, 
following the line of reasoning proposed by Lavelle et al. (2007), where supervisors create 
personal procedures and employees anthropomorphize the organization, employees might fail 
to separate the supervisor from the organization as the source of fairness. It then follows that 
both procedural justice and interactional justice can affect the attitudes of employees targeted 
towards the organization and the supervisor, depending on whom the individual perceive as the 
source of justice. Consequently, the responsible target for fair performance appraisal procedures 
might partially be superiors in the mind of the employee. Alternatively, the responsible target 
for fair interpersonal treatment might partially be the organization. Several studies have found 
significant spillover effects between procedural justice and trust in superior (e.g., Sholihin and 
Pike, 2009; Lau et al., 2008; Lau and Sholihin, 2005). However, it is specified that on average, 
target dissimilar effects will be smaller in magnitude than target similar effects (Rupp et al., 
2014). 
H5a Procedural justice is positively associated with trust in superior. 
H5b Interactional justice is positively associated with trust in organization. 
H5c Spillover effects are lower in magnitude compared to target similar effects.  
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4. Methodology 
 
This this chapter reviews the methodological framework utilized, and describe the process 
leading up to the empirical analysis. First, the survey research method is reviewed. Second, the 
development of the questionnaire – scales, priming, instruments and translation – is described. 
Third, the development and choice of the empirical model is documented. Finally, data quality 
methods and multicollinearity concerns are reviewed. 
The survey questionnaire4 includes additional organizational concepts excepted in the analysis 
of this thesis, such as managerial performance and job satisfaction. They were included because 
we were a few students, as well as my supervisors, researching connected phenomenon. 
Distributing the same questionnaire to the real estate company and other institutions enables 
comparison of data and a deeper insight. Additionally, the original blueprint for this thesis 
included supervisor-focused social exchange, and was supposed to examine trust in superior 
and commitment towards superior. However, just before distribution of the questionnaire, the 
real estate company refused the commitment instruments. Consequently, the research model, 
research problem and hypotheses had to be redesigned, which the extra instruments allowed 
without a complete reboot. 
4.1 Research method 
This study utilizes a survey to research the perceptions of individuals with respect to 
organizational justice, non-financial indicators for performance evaluation and trust. The aim 
of a survey in management accounting is to measure specific behaviours (Nazari et al., 2006). 
By using a survey, the respondents base their answers on self-reported perceptions of their 
situation. Even though surveys are associated with limitations (Ringdal, 2013), it matches the 
purpose of this study, which is to examine the beliefs, attitudes, values and opinions of 
employees, and not the objective situation. Subjective perceptions of reality may be more 
powerful than the objective reality because individuals act on their perceptions (Nazari et al., 
2006).  
                                                 
4 See appendix A. 
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4.2 Development of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed in Questback and administered to the respondents by e-mail. 
Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste (NSD) and the real estate company approved the 
questionnaire. 193 e-mails were distributed, and follow-up e-mails were sent after two and three 
weeks. Of the 193 respondents, 50 were ineligible or unable to answer as they were external 
advisors, summer-interns, on maternity leave or having quit their jobs. 126 responses was 
returned, yielding a response-rate of ~88 %. 5 responses was wrongly or unsatisfactorily 
completed, and removed from further analysis. 
4.2.1 Scales 
The questionnaire employs Likert scales. Distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional 
justice, affective commitment and trust use the range 1-7 (strongly disagree to strongly agree). 
Managerial performance uses the range 1-7 (very low to very high), while job satisfaction uses 
the range 1-9 with different wording for each question (e.g., not at all satisfied to extremely 
satisfied). The original phrasing of the instrument developed by Rusbult and Farrell (1983) is 
used. I debated whether to use the scale 1-7 throughout the questionnaire for consistency, but 
decided to keep the original scale of 1-9 in the job satisfaction instrument to make the 
respondent aware that job satisfaction used a different phrasing than the rest of the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, because the questionnaire asks for the respondent’s perception, an 
“I don’t know” or “No basis to respond” is omitted (except for the KPI instrument, where, after 
consultation with the real estate company, a “Not applicable” category was added). 
4.2.2 Priming of respondents 
When responding to a stimulus such as a questionnaire item, the respondent engage in a search 
for information until they encounter a piece of information they consider relevant (Wyer and 
Hartwick, 1980). This suggests that the answer may be greatly influenced by factors that affect 
which information the respondent will retrieve (Vitale et al., 2008). It is vital that the 
respondents answers the items with concern to their own situation at the company, and do not 
consider for instance friends, co-workers or companies in general. Additionally, it is paramount 
that the respondents consider the context the items refer too. For instance, the procedural justice 
instrument refers to procedures concerning performance appraisal and the organizational trust 
instrument refers to the general leadership of the organization when asking about the 
respondent’s employer. To ascertain that the respondents regard their own situation at the 
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company, and keep the correct setting in mind, priming of the respondents was applied before 
each instrument5 (except job satisfaction – the instrument was considered highly self-
explanatory and direct). Priming refers to the cognitive mechanism by which an attitude is 
created or influenced by a preceding question or statement (Moss and Lawrence, 1997). By 
including priming in the questionnaire a source of information is added that the respondents 
can draw upon in order to arrive at a useful and informative answer (Schwarz, 1999). Priming 
may therefore help the validity and reliability of the answers. 
4.2.3 Instruments and descriptive statistics 
A key principle in this study is the ability to compare and contrast results with reference works, 
which the usage of already established and thoroughly tested instruments facilitates. A faulty 
questionnaire construction may result in measurement error (Dillman et al., 2008). 
Consequently, the instruments were carefully chosen to fit the research objective while being 
comparative to previous research. The instruments have been widely used and cited, and 
demonstrated to be of high construct validity and reliability. 
It is noted that the originality of the instruments have been compromised, as the instrument have 
been translated and a few of the original items altered. The translation process is discussed in 
the following section (4.2.4). Organizational trust item number six was removed from the 
questionnaire. In the original work by Robinson and Rousseau (1994) the item was removed in 
the analysis because it was perceived as too close to procedural justice. Therefore, it was 
removed first-hand from this study. Three of the original instruments included reverse-scored 
items. However, the pilot questionnaire received heavy pushback from the real estate company 
regarding the reverse-scored items. On the one hand, it is argued that reverse-scored items keep 
the respondent alert, thus reducing response bias (Spector, 1992). On the other hand, it is 
suggested that reverse-scored items are associated with lower validity and the possibility of 
increased systematic error (Jackson et al., 1993; Schriesheim and Hill, 1981; Hinkin, 1995). 
Additionally, it is believed that positively worded items are more reliable and accurate than 
reverse-scored items (Schriesheim et al., 1991). It has been debated whether the inclusion of 
reverse-scored items is really necessary (Magazine et al., 1996). Finally, it has been 
demonstrated that removing the reverse-scored items helps, rather than obstructs, the 
psychometric properties (Rodebaugh et al., 2007). Based on the above arguments, and 
                                                 
5 Priming of the respondents is included in appendix A. 
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Figure 2: Descriptive statistics, financial and non-financial indicators 
consultation with the real estate company, it was decided that the reverse-scored questions be 
rephrased in a positive way. 
Non-financial and financial performance indicators – KPI (key performance indicators) 
To measure the importance of non-financial indicators vis-à-vis financial indicators the 
instrument developed by Hoque et al. (2001) was used. The instrument has been reliable and 
valid in previous research (Lau and Sholihin, 2005; Hoque et al., 2001; Hoque and James, 
2000). In order to fit the real estate company’s appraisal system, different financial and non-
financial KPIs had to be used than those constituting the original instrument. The KPI scale in 
this thesis was developed in cooperation with the real estate company in order to ensure 
meaningful and relevant KPIs to the employees. This instrument investigates the perceived 
importance of non-financial and financial indicators in performance evaluation of individuals. 
Therefore, it asks respondents what they believe. The order of the KPIs was randomized to hide 
the fact that two separate constructs (non-financial indicators and financial indicators) were 
measured. The randomization process was conducted through Excel and the random() 
function6. The first item on the list (management income) was assigned a random number. Then 
the second item on the list was assigned a random number, and so forth, until all fourteen items 
were placed in haphazard order. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
Renewal_leases 104 1 8 6,08 1,989 3,955 
Rent_receivable 104 1 8 5,88 2,233 4,984 
Hours_inservice 104 1 8 4,60 2,219 4,923 
Green_property 104 1 8 5,07 2,137 4,568 
Management_result 104 1 8 6,34 1,398 1,954 
Customer_satisfaction 104 1 8 6,33 1,347 1,814 
Interest_expense 104 1 8 5,02 2,550 6,504 
Operating_cost 104 1 8 5,96 1,832 3,358 
ROI 104 1 8 5,81 1,946 3,788 
Number_green_leases 104 1 8 4,92 2,326 5,412 
New_leases 104 1 8 5,95 1,754 3,075 
Coworker_satisfaction 104 1 8 5,98 1,558 2,427 
Economic_occupancy 104 1 8 5,91 1,801 3,245 
Adm.cost_to_lease_value 
104 1 8 5,45 2,167 4,697 
Valid N (listwise) 104           
                                                 
6 In order to generate a random number between 1 and 14, the formula random()*(1-14)+14 was used in Excel. 
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Distributive, procedural, and interactional justice 
The instrument developed by Moorman (1991) was chosen to measure organizational justice. 
It considers the three justice dimensions (distributive, procedural and interactional). In 
retrospect, the measure developed by Moorman have helped confirm interactional justice as a 
separate element of justice (Colquitt et al., 2005). However, the instrument measures aspects of 
both procedural and interactional justice, and as a result, procedural and interactional justice 
are often highly correlated (Colquitt et al., 2005). Lau and Sholihin (2005) used the instrument 
devised by Mcfarlin and Sweeney (1992), which do not consider interactional justice. 
Moorman’s instrument measures the respondent’s perceptions of the fairness of the procedures 
employed for evaluation of the employees’ performance, just like the instrument by Mcfarlin 
and Sweeney, while also measuring the employees’ perceptions of interactional treatment. 
Interactional justice is an integrative part of this thesis, and the instrument developed by 
Moorman recognizes this facet of organizational justice. 
The instrument does not define “fairly”. The objective of this thesis is to address the perceptions 
of employees and the entailed consequences, and therefore, what matters is the individuals’ 
definitions of “fair”. Following the same line of reasoning, “rewards” are undefined. Whether 
rewards are pay, bonus, praise, recognition etc. depends on the individual, and his or her 
perceptions. A limitation with not defining ambiguous expressions could be misinterpretation. 
For example, a respondent might feel unfairly rewarded because he or she only considers 
rewards to be material. However, if the respondent would have realized that rewards were both 
 
  
Figure 3: Descriptive statistics, procedural (PJ) and interactional justice (IJ) 
Descriptive Statistics  Descriptive Statistics 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance    N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
PJ1 104 1 7 4,87 1,293 1,671  
IJ1 104 1 7 5,85 1,342 1,801 
PJ2 104 1 7 4,31 1,330 1,768  
IJ2 104 1 7 5,84 1,401 1,963 
PJ3 104 1 7 4,55 1,372 1,881  
IJ3 104 1 7 5,34 1,492 2,225 
PJ4 104 1 7 4,76 1,318 1,738  
IJ4 104 1 7 6,19 1,278 1,633 
PJ5 104 1 7 4,33 1,333 1,776  
IJ5 104 1 7 6,20 1,218 1,483 
PJ6 104 1 7 4,46 1,343 1,804  
IJ6 104 1 7 6,26 1,262 1,592 
PJ7 
104 1 7 4,35 1,221 1,491 
 
Valid 
N 104           
Valid 
N 104           
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tangible and intangible, he or she might have answered differently. Consequently, the validity 
of the answers may be lowered, as I measure a slightly different phenomenon than is the 
objective of my study. 
Trust in supervisor 
Read’s (1962) instrument was chosen because it has been widely used in management 
accounting studies (e.g., Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Magner and Welker, 1994; Magner et 
al., 1995; Lau and Tan, 2006), and it is the instrument adopted by Lau and Sholihin (2005). The 
instrument reflects employees’ perception of their supervisors’ motives and intentions with 
respect to matters relevant to the employees’ career and status. Adopting an extensively used 
instrument facilitates comparison of results. 
Descriptive Statistics  Descriptive Statistics 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance    N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
TS1 104 1 7 5,29 1,512 2,285  
TO1 104 1 7 5,97 1,273 1,621 
TS2 104 1 7 5,98 1,441 2,077  
TO2 104 1 7 5,87 1,285 1,652 
TS3 104 1 7 5,65 1,575 2,481  
TO3 104 1 7 6,04 1,206 1,455 
TS4 104 1 7 5,70 1,624 2,638  
TO4 104 1 7 6,23 1,063 1,131 
Valid 
N 104           
 
TO5 
104 1 7 6,03 1,273 1,621 
        
TO6 104 1 7 6,24 1,170 1,369 
        
Valid 
N 104           
Figure 4: Descriptive statistics, trust in superior (TS) and trust in organization (TO) 
Trust in organization 
The instrument developed by Robinson and Rousseau (1994) was chosen. It is based on the 
tenet that violation of reciprocal obligations and psychological contracts can generate distrust, 
dissatisfaction and even dissolution of the relationship, playing along with social exchange 
theorizing. An important attribute of the instrument is that it refers to trust in employer (i.e., the 
organization), and not supervisor. Thus, it enables distinction between the superior and the 
organization, referring to two different referents of trust, necessary in order to apply a multifoci 
perspective. 
Managerial performance 
Mahoney’s (1965) instrument was chosen because it is a much used and recognized instrument 
(e.g., Sholihin and Pike, 2009; Lau et al., 2008; Lau and Moser, 2008). It captures the 
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multidimensionality of managerial performance without excessive complexity (Brownell, 
1982). Because it is extensively applied in management accounting research, it enables 
comparison of results. 
Job satisfaction 
Lau and Sholihin (2005) applied the extensively used Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire 
developed by Weiss et al. (1967). The instrument is copyrighted and thus not available. 
Therefore, the instrument developed by Rusbult and Farrell (1983) was adopted to measure job 
satisfaction. The instrument is one of the few job satisfaction questionnaires available in its 
entirety with proven levels of construct validity and reliability. 
4.2.4 Translation of the instruments 
In order to ensure understandability on the part of the respondents, the instruments were 
translated to the employees’ mother tongue. Two bilingual researchers and three students 
translated the instruments. Opining different versions and challenging each other’s translations 
increased the quality and accuracy of the translations. The preliminary translations were sent to 
the real estate company, co-workers and family, and reworked to fit the organization and to 
ensure understandability and coherence. Testing the questionnaire on both academics and non-
academics ascertained that the items were understandable with and without an academic degree. 
In the translation process, one item was translated in a slightly deviating manner from the 
original version. Item number seven in the procedural justice instrument (Moorman, 1991) goes 
as follows: Procedures are designed to allow for requests for clarification. However, if the 
translated version would be translated back to English it would be closer to Procedures are 
designed in a way that invites requests for clarification. The phrasing was altered procedures 
rarely out-of-hand denies requests for clarification. If an employee sought explanations, it could 
most likely be obtained through supervisor, HR-department or similar authorities. 
Consequently, the original phrasing does not describe a fair or unfair procedure, and thus it 
makes no sense for the respondent to disagree with the statement. The instrument was “designed 
to measure the degree to which fair procedures are used in the organization” (Moorman, 1991, 
p. 847). By rephrasing the item, the wording reflects a fair procedure and the original intent of 
the authors.  
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4.3 Model development 
4.3.1 Exploratory factor analysis 
An exploratory factor analysis is a technique used to uncover the underlying structure of the 
observed variables. The analysis identifies latent factors, and examines how closely related the 
variables are to the factors. The factor analysis simplifies a complex data set to a smaller set of 
latent factors (Ringdal, 2013). An exploratory factor analysis was applied to the KPI instrument, 
the justice instruments and the trust instruments7. 
KPI instrument 
The KPI instrument was designed to accommodate the real estate company. Consequently, this 
particular set of performance indicators have not been applied previously. The instrument was 
designed with seven financial items and seven non-financial items, in cooperation with the real 
estate company. However, because no prior research exists, the statistical data drives the 
interpretation of the latent variables. Therefore, an exploratory factor analysis was undertaken 
to uncover the latent variables, and the results compared with theory. 
To facilitate the factor analysis, I divided the data into managers and non-managers. The real 
estate company’s evaluation system of managers is financially oriented, while the evaluation 
system for the blue-collar workers is to a higher degree non-financially oriented. The main point 
of interest in my thesis is the non-financial aspect of performance evaluation. Furthermore, the 
‘not applicable’ category (originally value 8 which indicates great importance) was recoded as 
unimportant. An item that is perceived as not applicable to an employee’s performance 
evaluation is assumed equivalent to highly unimportant when determining performance. 
The factor analysis was conducted with principal axis factoring. If the assumption of normality 
is violated, principal axis factoring will, in general, give better results than principal 
components (Costello and Osborne, 2005). Because the instrument was designed in a way that 
the respondents would find some few of the items to be important while the majority would be 
unimportant or less important, the KPI instrument is characterized by non-normality8. 
Furthermore, the oblique rotation method promax was used. The distinction between certain 
non-financial and financial indicators is ambiguous, which may create correlating factors. 
                                                 
7 See appendix B1 for exploratory factor analysis of the justice and trust instruments. 
8 See appendix C for normality test. 
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Additionally, Costello and Osborne (2005) recommend oblique rotation methods, because if 
the factors do not correlate the results will be more or less the same with oblique and orthogonal 
rotation. 
The sample size is relatively small. A factor analysis operates well with large samples. 
However, strong data may make up for this. Strong data have high communalities (> 0.8) and 
several variables loading strongly on each factor without cross-loadings (Costello and Osborne, 
2005). This is rarely achieved in practice. The communalities of the initial factor analysis 
ranged from low (0.302) to high (0.908). Some practitioners advise removing variables with 
communalities below 0.4 from further analysis as it is argued the variable does not relate to the 
other items or that an additional factor should be explored (Costello and Osborne, 2005). On 
the other hand, it is argued that factors with communality of 0.32 or above should be kept, as a 
loading of 0.32 approximately equals 10 % overlapping variance with other items in that factor 
(Costello and Osborne, 2005). An analysis without coworker_satisfaction (low loading of 
0.302) was conducted, but the initial analysis showed stronger results9. Therefore, the analysis 
proceeded with all variables; keeping all the variables improves maneuverability, which is an 
advantage when working without the guidance of extant literature. 
This factor analysis was undertaken based on the eigenvalue above 1 criterion. Analyses with 
forced factor extraction was undertaken, as Costello and Osborne (2005) show that the 
eigenvalue criterion is among the least accurate methods. However, forcing the numbers of 
factors to two, three and five did not yield better statistical results nor results more theoretically 
correct. Cross-loading items should be dropped if there are several adequate to strong loaders 
(above 0.50) (Costello and Osborne, 2005). In order to clean the pattern matrix, 
number_green_leases was removed as it cross-loaded and additional adequate loaders existed. 
This yielded a clean matrix with moderate to strong loadings. However, with respect to theory, 
it loaded confusingly with mixed financial and non-financial indicators. Thus, items that 
theoretically did not belong in a factor was attempted removed. The final result was a four-
factor model, with adequate to strong loadings10. Renewal_leases loaded 0.433 and ROI cross-
loaded. Despite this, the result is adequate and according to theory. The instrument was 
designed with seven financial and seven non-financial factors, which should be reflected in the 
interpretation of the factors. Because this instrument relates to one specific real estate company, 
                                                 
9 The factors explained slightly more of the variance of the variables, but three more variables cross-loaded. 
10 See appendix B2. 
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the methodology used by Hoque et al. (2001), whom distributed questionnaires to a century of 
companies, cannot be utilized here. Therefore, the results cannot be expected to be along the 
same lines either. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 0.793, signifying significant gains 
from data reduction. The p-value is 0.000, confirming that the variables correlate, and that data 
reduction is OK. The four-factor model explains approximately 60.5 % of the variance in the 
eleven variables. The factors correlate strongly, posing concerns for discriminate validity 
(Farrell and Rudd, 2009). However, the correlations are below the critical benchmark of 0.7, 
indicating that the factors measure different constructs. 
Factor 1 comprises operating costs, return on investment, management result and number of 
environmentally certified properties. The factor is financially oriented, apart from the number 
of environmentally green properties, signifying financial importance in performance 
evaluation. The item green_property was eliminated from further analysis. Factor 2 comprises 
customer satisfaction and co-worker satisfaction, and is non-financially oriented. Factor 3 
constitutes hours of in-service training, interest expense and administrative cost compared to 
lease value. It is financially oriented apart from the hours of in-service training, which was 
eliminated from further analysis. The final factor consists of number of new leases and renewal 
of existing leases, and is non-financially oriented. This result fits the theoretical foundation with 
a distinction between financial and non-financial indicators. Rent receivable, number of green 
leases, economic occupancy, hours of in-service training and number of environmentally 
certified properties were removed from further analysis, leaving four non-financial performance 
indicators and five financial performance indicators. 
Interactional justice instrument and trust in superior instrument 
In the exploratory factor analysis, interactional justice and trust in superior converged11. This 
indicates that the items measure the same construct, which is contrary to theory. A forced two-
factor analysis was conducted, separating the two constructs12. The result was a clean pattern 
matrix with strong loadings, high communalities and significant gain from data reduction. The 
two-factor model explains 85.6 % of the variance in the six variables. 
                                                 
11 See appendix B1. 
12 See appendix B3. 
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A severe issue with these factors is redundancy (Farrell and Rudd, 2009). The two factors are 
practically measuring the same construct. Squared correlation equals 0.645: Almost two thirds 
of the variance in the items of one factor can be explained by the variance in the other factor. 
Thus, the discriminate validity of the instrument is low. This will cause problems with the 
structural equation modelling (SEM), as the software is more likely to reject models with 
redundancy. Therefore, instead of basing the SEM analysis on the factor analysis of 
interactional justice and trust in superior, variables were removed during the SEM analysis 
based on modification indices and loading strength. This ensured a model with good fit to the 
data. 
4.3.2 Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
In order to test my model and hypothesizes, SEM is appropriate. With simultaneous dependent 
latent variables (procedural justice and interactional justice), regression analysis cannot be 
employed. SEM is a multivariate technique that combines multivariate regression and 
confirmatory factor analysis to explain the relationship between multiple variables (Hair et al., 
2006). It allows researchers to model the relationship among variables after accounting for the 
measurement error and it provides goodness-of-fit statistics. Adequate goodness-of-fit statistics 
signifies that the relationships between the variables in the research model are supported by the 
data. 
The original specification of the model, with direct paths between procedural justice and 
interactional justice (link C), did not meet the order condition required for simultaneous 
equations (Bollen, 1989). Consequently, LISREL could not identify specific parameters, as 
there was no unique solution to the equations set. To satisfy the order condition, the direct paths 
between procedural justice and interactional justice were removed, and instead correlation 
between the two constructs was opened. Thus, the direct effect of procedural justice on 
interactional justice and vice versa cannot be quantified. However, the correlation is a token of 
the characteristics of the relationship. Other methods of dealing with an identification issue 
exists (Bollen, 1989), but this procedure gave the best fit to data. 
A number of variables were removed from the final analysis. The modification indices provided 
by LISREL indicate data misfit by indicating how much the chi-square value would be lowered 
if the constrained parameter were freed (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). LISREL suggested 
freeing variables (e.g., interactional justice item 6) to latent variables (e.g., procedural justice) 
that theoretically do not belong. These variables were removed from the analysis, in order to 
30 
 
improve the model fit without compromising theory. Furthermore, LISREL suggested freeing 
the covariance between error-terms of variables belonging to different constructs. However, it 
is undesired that the error-terms of variables correlate, especially between different constructs 
(Hooper et al., 2008). To improve the model fit without compromising theory, the offending 
variables were removed from the analysis.  Removing PJ5, PJ7, IJ1, IJ3, IJ4, IJ6, TS1, TS4, 
TO2 and TO4 provided the best fit to data. 
4.3.3 Multivariate normality and maximum likelihood estimation 
Normality refers to the distribution of sample data that corresponds to a normal distribution 
(Ringdal, 2013). Multivariate normality exists if the collected variables have neither significant 
skewness nor kurtosis, and is a requirement in maximum likelihood estimation. With 
continuous variables in structural equation modelling, maximum likelihood estimation is the 
preferred choice (Sharma, 1996). The sample consists of continuous data, but is characterized 
by non-normality13. Therefore, the analysis conducted in LISREL is done with robust maximum 
likelihood estimation. This technique utilizes the covariance matrix and the asymptotic 
covariance matrix and accounts for skewness and kurtosis (Sharma, 1996). However, robust 
maximum likelihood operates well with a large sample size, preferably above 400. My sample 
size is well below the threshold, which may have large effects on standard errors and tests of 
significance in the analysis. 
4.4 Data quality 
4.4.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is the extent to which one construct may be explained by the other constructs 
in the analysis (Ringdal, 2013). Multicollinearity affects regressions, leading to inaccurate 
estimates of coefficients and standard errors, as well as inference errors. Multicollinearity is an 
ambiguous challenge as SEM incorporates measurement error. Therefore, the impact of 
multicollinearity on parameter estimates is difficult to ascertain (Grewal et al., 2004). 
The data is characterized by multicollinearity: Independent variables are insignificant despite a 
high r-squared; standard errors are higher than the beta values; several beta weights are bizarre 
with negative beta values but positive correlation; the correlation matrix shows high 
                                                 
13 See appendix C for tests of multivariate normality. 
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correlations; the variance inflation factor (VIF) is above the problematic threshold of 10 for 
several variables14 (Grewal et al., 2004). 
Grewal et al. (2004) concludes that a high degree of multicollinearity combined with low 
measure reliability, a small sample size and low explained variance in endogenous constructs 
causes severe problems in structural equation modelling. The composite reliability measure of 
the constructs is high and the explained variance is high. Therefore, despite moderate 
multicollinearity and a small sample size, no steps are taken to address the issue prior to the 
SEM analysis. During the SEM analysis, variables were removed based on modification indices 
and loading strength; removing variables that strongly correlate is a recognized method to 
reduce multicollinearity (Kline, 2012). Therefore, it is assumed that multicollinearity poses a 
low threat to statistical conclusions. An acceptably low condition number (12.186) supports this 
conclusion (Belsley et al., 2005). 
4.4.2 Reliability 
Reliability is the degree to which the observed variable measures the ‘true’ value – whether 
several measures with the same instrument gives the same result (Ringdal, 2013). There are 
several ways to test the reliability of the data. The composite reliability (CR) is a measure of 
scale reliability, checking how closely related a set of items are as a group (Ringdal, 2013). The 
average variance extracted (AVE) estimate is the average amount of variation a latent variable 
is able to explain in the observed variables to which it is theoretically related (Farrell, 2010). A 
CR value above 0.7 and an AVE value above 0.5 is considered good (Chin, 1998). 
4.4.3 Validity 
Construct validity is the accuracy of the observed variables, specifically whether they measure 
the intended construct (Ringdal, 2013). Construct validity is a necessity in order to obtain 
meaningful and relevant results. This relationship is difficult to measure, and a solid theoretical 
foundation is vital when the measurement instrument is developed. This thesis utilizes 
recognized measurement instruments with proven construct validity. However, translating the 
instrument poses a challenge to the construct validity, as nuances and distinctions extant in the 
original phrasing may have been lost. 
                                                 
14 See appendix E for correlation matrices and appendix D for collinearity statistics. 
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Construct validity is often defined by the subcategories convergent validity and discriminant 
validity. Convergent validity refers to the degree to which two measures of a construct that 
theoretically should be related, in fact are related. Discriminant validity, on the other hand, 
examines whether two measures that should not be related are unrelated. 
4.4.4 Model fit 
A model is said fit the observed data to the extent that the model-implied covariance matrix is 
equivalent to the empirical covariance matrix (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003, p. 23). However, 
there is no consensus regarding what constitutes a “good fit”. Therefore, the fit indices should 
be considered simultaneously (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). A multitude of fit measures 
exist; the ones considered in this thesis are recommended by Schermelleh-Engel et al. (2003) 
and Hammervold and Olsson (2012). 
The chi-square test (𝝌𝟐-test) 
The chi-square test examines if the population’s covariance matrix is equal to the model-
implied covariance matrix. The empirical covariance matrix is used as a proxy for the 
population’s covariance matrix. The null-hypothesis is that the covariance matrices are 
equivalent, and that the model perfectly fits the data. Thus, a low chi-square and a high p-value 
(> 0.05) is desirable. The prerequisite that the matrices are equivalent is strict; acceptance of 
the model from the chi-square test is hard to achieve. It presupposes that the data is 
characterized by multivariate normality and a large sample size. Since my data is non-normal, 
the Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square (C3) is utilized as it is correct even with multivariate 
non-normal data. However, it is sensitive to kurtosis and works best with very large samples (> 
1000).The low sample size poses inference limitations, regardless of whether normal or robust 
estimation is applied. 
Additionally, the χ2/𝑑𝑓 measure is calculated. The degrees of freedom in the model are 
constant, and therefore the measure indicates fit without regard to sample size. A value below 
2 indicates good fit, while a value between 2 and 3 is acceptable. 
Root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) and the close-fit test 
RMSEA is a fit index used in the close-fit test. The test estimates the error of approximation 
and represents the degree of fit to the population’s covariance matrix, as opposed to the 
dichotomous chi-square test (perfect fit or no fit). A RMSEA value below 0.05 indicates a good 
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fit, and a value below 0.08 indicates an acceptable fit. Additionally, a p-value of the close-fit 
test above 0.10 indicates good fit and a p-value between 0.05 and 0.10 indicates acceptable fit. 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
SRMR evince the remaining residuals between the empirical covariance matrix and the model-
implied covariance matrix after the estimation of the parameters. The measure depends on 
sample size and is sensitive to wrongly specified models. Therefore, it is difficult to create 
consistent rules of thumb, but a value below 0.05 is recognized as good, while below 0.10 is 
seen as acceptable. 
Goodness of fit index (GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) 
GFI compares the model with a null-model (all parameters specified as zero), indicating how 
well theory and data conform. GFI ranges between 0 and 1 (although negative values may occur, 
which suggests that the proposed model is worse than no model). The closer to 1 the better the 
model-implied covariance matrix conform to the empirical covariance matrix. GFI of 0.95 or 
above is good, while above 0.90 is acceptable. AGFI is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Values 
above 0.90 indicate good fit, while values above 0.85 indicate acceptable fit. 
Comparative fit index (CFI) 
CFI compares the model with a null-model, and compares the null-model’s covariance matrix 
with the observed covariance matrix. CFI ranges between 0 and 1, and values above 0.97 
indicate good fit, while values above 0.95 indicate acceptable fit. 
Normal fit index (NFI) 
NFI is affected by small sample sizes. Therefore, it may be lower than the data suggests, even 
though the model is correctly specified. NFI ranges between 0 and 1, and a value above 0.95 
indicates good fit and a value above 0.90 indicates acceptable fit.  
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5. Results: Structural equation modelling 
 
In this chapter the results of the SEM analysis is presented. The analysis was conducted on two 
models, one with non-financial indicators and one with financial indicators. The two-model 
approach facilitates comparison of the use of non-financial indicators versus financial indicators 
in performance evaluation. First, the non-financial model is presented and discussed with 
summary tables, standardized residuals, indirect effects, model fit, reliability and validity. Then 
the financial model is presented and discussed. 
5.1 The non-financial model 
Table 1 presents the standardized solutions, standard errors, t-values and the explained variance 
of the parameters by the latent factor (r-squared). 
Indicator Parameter Standardized 
solution 
Standard 
error 
t-value r2 
Measurement model X 
Renewal of leases 𝜆11
𝑥  0.64 0.215 5.894* 0.405 
Customer satisfaction 𝜆21
𝑥  0.62 0.245 3.416* 0.386 
New leases 𝜆31
𝑥  0.71 0.187 6.653* 0.505 
Co-worker satisfaction 𝜆41
𝑥  0.55 0.220 3.883* 0.300 
Variance error-term1 δ1 0.60 0.528 4.459* - 
Variance error-term2 δ2 0.61 0.235 4.750* - 
Variance error-term3 δ3 0.50 0.351 4.340* - 
Variance error-term4 δ4 0.70 0.313 5.423* - 
Measurement model Y 
PJ2 𝜆21
𝑦
 0.73 0.129 7.526* 0.530 
PJ3 𝜆31
𝑦
 0.90 0.103 11.960* 0.806 
PJ4 𝜆41
𝑦
 0.84 0.105 10.604* 0.713 
PJ6 𝜆51
𝑦
 0.81 0.113 9.552* 0.648 
IJ5 𝜆72
𝑦
 0.92 0.102 10.972* 0.849 
TS3 𝜆93
𝑦
 0.93 0.091 16.075* 0.868 
TO3 𝜆11,4
𝑦
 0.91 0.081 13.507* 0.833 
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TO5 𝜆12,5
𝑦
 0.96 0.059 20.845* 0.923 
TO6 𝜆13,4
𝑦
 0.80 0.128 7.257* 0.632 
Variance error-term1 ε1 0.37 0.134 4.619* - 
Variance error-term2 ε2 0.47 0.170 4.890* - 
Variance error-term3 ε3 0.19 0.080 4.578* - 
Variance error-term4 ε4 0.29 0.103 4.852* - 
Variance error-term5 ε5 0.35 0.132 4.790* - 
Variance error-term6 ε6 0.29 0.323 1.788 - 
Variance error-term7 ε7 0.15 0.049 4.550* - 
Variance error-term8 ε8 0.15 0.095 3.381* - 
Variance error-term9 ε9 0.13 0.104 3.138* - 
Variance error-term10 ε10 0.07 0.039 3.088* - 
Variance error-term11 ε11 0.17 0.057 4.306* - 
Variance error-term12 ε12 0.08 0.037 3.397* - 
Variance error-term13 ε13 0.37 0.127 3.972* - 
Structural model 
NFI  PJ γ11 0.25 0.150 1.669 - 
NFI  IJ γ21 0.21 0.176 1.183 - 
PJ  TS 𝛽31 -0.08 0.060 -1.306 - 
PJ  TO 𝛽41 0.33 0.085 3.942* - 
IJ  TS 𝛽32 1.00 0.092 10.946* - 
IJ  TO 𝛽42 0.57 0.131 4.336* - 
PJ ↔ IJ 𝜓21 0.56 0.191 2.671* - 
PJ 𝜂1 - - - 0.063 
IJ 𝜂2 - - - 0.044 
TS 𝜂3 - - - 0.918 
TO 𝜂4 - - - 0.668 
Table 1: Summary table non-financial parameters. Asterisk (*) marked parameters are significant at a 5 % level.  
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5.1.1 Measurement model X 
The t-values of the standardized solutions are all above the critical value of |1.98|15. The data 
indicates that the non-financial performance measurements renewal of leases, customer 
satisfaction, new leases and co-worker satisfaction are significant variables indicating the 
importance of non-financial measures in performance evaluation. The factor loadings are 
moderate to high with low standard errors, yielding high t-values. The variance of the error-
terms is significant. 
5.1.2 Measurement model Y 
The parameters of the observed variables, 𝜆𝑖𝑗
𝑦
, are significant. The data signals that procedural 
justice items 2, 3, 4 and 6 are significant indicators of procedural justice; that interactional 
justice item 5 is a significant indicator of interactional justice; that trust in superior item 3 is a 
significant indicator of trust in superior; and that trust in organization items 3, 5 and 6 are 
significant indicators of trust in organization. The loadings are high and the standard errors are 
low. The variance to IJ2’s error term is not significant. The error term presents the amount at 
which the equation may differ during the analysis, but this variance is not trustworthy in the 
case of IJ2, which is a weakness. 
5.1.3 Structural model 
The effect of non-financial performance measures in performance evaluation on procedural 
justice and interactional justice is not significant. Neither is the effect of procedural justice on 
trust in superior, which also indicates a negative relationship between the constructs. The effects 
of procedural justice and interactional justice on trust in organization and interactional justice 
on trust in superior are significant, with moderate to high loadings. The data indicates that 
interactional justice explains 100 % of the variance of trust in superior. Furthermore, it indicates 
that interactional justice explains the majority of the variance of trust in organization. The 
correlation between procedural justice and interactional justice is positive and strong. This 
indicates that if procedural justice increases by ‘one’, interactional justice will on average 
increase by 0.561.  
                                                 
15 112 degrees of freedom give approximately |1.98| critical value from the Students’ t-Distribution Critical Points 
table. 
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5.1.4 Standardized residuals 
Residuals are the estimated difference between observed value and predicted value. The 
standardized residuals are residuals divided by estimated standard error. The standardized 
residual matrix may reveal misfit; it is the difference between the empirical covariance matrix 
and the model-implied covariance matrix that drives tests of overall fit (Schermelleh-Engel et 
al., 2003). Standardized residuals with an absolute value above 2 may indicate misfit; however, 
the largest standardized value is |1.440|16. 
5.1.5 Indirect effect 
The indirect effect of non-financial measures-based performance evaluation on trust in 
organization and trust in superior were calculated as follows: 
 
Trust in organization: 
Path (1)   NFI-PJ-TO  0.25×0.33  0.0825 
Path (2)   NFI-IJ-TO  0.21×0.57  0.1197 
Indirect effect         0.2022 
 
Trust in superior: 
Path (1)   NFI-PJ-TS  0.25×-0.08  -0.020 
Path (2)   NFI-IJ-TS  0.21×1.00  0.2100 
Indirect effect         0.1900 
 
  
                                                 
16 See appendix F1 for standardized residuals matrix. 
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5.1.6 Model fit 
Goodness-of-fit measure Value Assessment 
Chi-square (C3) 136.774 Good fit 
Chi-square test (p-value) 0.0558 Accepts the model 
χ2/𝑑𝑓  1.221 Good fit 
Close-fit test (p-value) 0.0748 Acceptable fit 
RMSEA 0.0696 Acceptable fit 
SRMR 0.0624 Acceptable fit 
GFI 0.848 Bad fit 
AGFI 0.792 Bad fit 
CFI 0.960 Acceptable fit 
NFI 0.892 Bad fit 
Table 2: Goodness-of-fit statistics, non-financial model 
The chi-square test accepts the model based on the Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square, which 
indicates that the model-implied covariance matrix is equal to the empirical covariance matrix. 
However, it should be noted that the chi-square test is compromised due to a small sample size, 
which may affect the inference. 
LISREL suggests opening correlation between the error terms of the 𝜆ij
𝑥 variables (renewal of 
leases, new leases, customer and co-worker satisfaction). The potential chi-square reduction 
gain from opening correlation between e.g. renewal of leases’s error term and new leases’s error 
term is significant, with a modification value of 57.42. This would improve the model’s fit to 
the data. However, correlation between the error terms is not justified from a theoretical 
perspective. Correlating error terms represents some issues not specified in the model causing 
the covariation (Hooper et al., 2008). It could represent an unaccounted for common factor, or 
that one item partly causes the other. The theoretical framework does not imply any reason for 
correlating error terms, and freeing correlation is a step that needs to be clearly substantiated 
(Hooper et al., 2008). Therefore, the correlation between the error terms is fixed. 
RMSEA, the close-fit test, SRMR and CFI indicates acceptable fit. GFI, AGFI and NFI indicate 
bad fit. However, these rules of thumb criteria are arbitrary (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). 
Misspecification, small sample bias, effects of violation of normality and estimation-method 
effects may affect fit indices. The NFI is just below the threshold of 0.9, and is sensitive to 
small samples. NFI and GFI should be interpreted simultaneously as a measure of noise in the 
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data (Hammervold and Olsson, 2012). The difference between NFI and GFI is 0.044, indicating 
a relatively low degree of noise. In conclusion, the model has an acceptable fit when the low 
sample size and multivariate non-normality is taken into account. 
5.1.7 Reliability 
The composite reliability and the average variance extracted measures were satisfactory17. They 
were all above 0.7 (CR) and 0.5 (AVE), with the exception of the average variance extracted 
for non-financial performance indicators (0.399). 
Another measure of reliability is r-squared, which indicates the degree of variance in the 
observed variables explained by the latent variable. Values between 0.35 and 0.5 indicate 
moderate reliability, while values above 0.5 indicate high reliability. Co-worker satisfaction has 
low reliability. 30 % of the variance in co-worker satisfaction is explained by the latent variable 
NFI. Renewal of leases and customer satisfaction have moderate reliability, and new leases and 
the remaining observed variables explaining PJ, IJ, TS and TO show high reliability. 
The r-squared of the structural model varies. The latent variables procedural justice and 
interactional justice have an r-squared of 0.063 and 0.044 respectively. These values are very 
low, indicating that NFI does not adequately explain the variance in procedural and interactional 
justice. This is connected to the fact that the estimates are not significant; NFI cannot explain 
the variance of PJ and IJ when it does not significantly affect them. The r-squared of trust in 
organization is 0.668, which is high. However, it indicates that the model misses some facets 
explaining the variance of trust in organization. The r-squared of trust in superior is 0.918, 
which is great. The model captures almost all the variance of trust in superior. 
In conclusion, it looks like the non-financial performance indicators suffer from lower 
reliability than the rest of the instruments. This may be because the KPIs had to be altered to fit 
the real estate company. However, all things considered, the reliability of the model seems to 
be relatively high.  
                                                 
17 See appendix G for calculation of composite reliability and average variance extracted. 
40 
 
5.1.8 Validity 
There is no simple method to measure construct validity. The usage of established instruments 
works in favour of construct validity. The correlation matrix indicates partially strong 
convergent validity18. The observed variables of procedural justice correlate; the observed 
variables of interactional justice correlate; the observed variables of trust in superior correlate; 
and the observed variables of trust in organization correlate, indicating that the observed 
variables measure the correct construct. The non-financial indicators and the financial 
indicators are slightly more problematic, with lower correlations. This indicates that the 
variables may be measuring slightly different constructs, which is further emphasized by the 
difficulty of performing a theoretically sound exploratory factor analysis on the KPI instrument. 
Additionally, the exploratory factor analysis and the correlation matrix express concerns with 
regard to discriminant validity. Trust in superior and interactional justice converge on the same 
factor, when in theory there should be two. This indicates low discriminant validity, as the 
observed variables of two unrelated constructs relate. In the final analysis, several variables 
were removed, reducing the intercorrelation between the constructs which may improve 
discriminant validity. Even so, the fact that interactional justice’s effect on trust in superior is 
1.00 corroborates low discriminant validity. 
In conclusion, although established instrument were used in order to ascertain construct 
validity, the model appears to suffer from limitations. The KPI instrument faces concerns with 
regard to convergent validity, while interactional justice and trust in superior’s discriminant 
validity is problematic.  
                                                 
18 See appendix E for correlation matrix. 
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5.2 The financial model 
Table 3 presents the standardized solutions, standard errors, t-values and the explained variance 
of the parameters by the latent factor (r-squared). 
Indicator Parameter Standardized 
solution 
Standard 
error 
t-value r2 
Measurement model X 
Management profit 𝜆11
𝑥  0.63 0.175 5.052* 0.399 
Interest expense 𝜆21
𝑥  0.73 0.213 8.739 * 0.531 
Operating costs 𝜆31
𝑥  0.73 0.185 7.251* 0.539 
Return on investment 𝜆41
𝑥  0.77 0.189 7.959* 0.600 
Administrative cost 
compared to lease value 
𝜆51
𝑥  0.83 0.128 13.953* 0.682 
Variance error-term1 δ1 0.60 0.233 5.028* - 
Variance error-term2 δ2 0.47 0.640 4.761* - 
Variance error-term3 δ3 0.46 0.328 4.726* - 
Variance error-term4 δ4 0.40 0.257 5.894* - 
Variance error-term5 δ5 0.32 0.307 4.854*  
Measurement model Y 
PJ2 𝜆21
𝑦
 0.73 0.128 7.564* 0.531 
PJ3 𝜆31
𝑦
 0.90 0.103 11.982* 0.807 
PJ4 𝜆41
𝑦
 0.84 0.105 10.605* 0.713 
PJ6 𝜆51
𝑦
 0.80 0.113 9.552* 0.645 
IJ5 𝜆72
𝑦
 0.92 0.102 11.030* 0.846 
TS3 𝜆93
𝑦
 0.93 0.092 16.018* 0.868 
TO3 𝜆11,4
𝑦
 0.91 0.081 13.508* 0.832 
TO5 𝜆12,5
𝑦
 0.96 0.059 20.859* 0.923 
TO6 𝜆13,4
𝑦
 0.80 0.128 7.256* 0.632 
Variance error-term1 ε1 0.37 0.134 4.619* - 
Variance error-term2 ε2 0.47 0.170 4.878* - 
Variance error-term3 ε3 0.19 0.080 4.523* - 
Variance error-term4 ε4 0.29 0.102 4.872* - 
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Variance error-term5 ε5 0.35 0.134 4.768* - 
Variance error-term6 ε6 0.29 0.323 1.785 - 
Variance error-term7 ε7 0.15 0.050 4.540* - 
Variance error-term8 ε8 0.15 0.094 3.399* - 
Variance error-term9 ε9 0.13 0.104 3.162* - 
Variance error-term10 ε10 0.07 0.039 3.090* - 
Variance error-term11 ε11 0.17 0.057 4.308* - 
Variance error-term12 ε12 0.08 0.037 3.396* - 
Variance error-term13 ε13 0.37 0.127 3.972* - 
Structural model 
NFI  PJ γ11 0.17 0.126 1.343 - 
NFI  IJ γ21 0.03 0.137 0.199 - 
PJ  TS 𝛽31 -0.08 0.060 -1.346 - 
PJ  TO 𝛽41 0.33 0.084 3.933* - 
IJ  TS 𝛽32 1.01 0.092 10.995* - 
IJ  TO 𝛽42 0.57 0.131 4.361* - 
PJ ↔ IJ 𝜓21 0.61 0.191 2.671* - 
PJ 𝜂1 - - - 0.029 
IJ 𝜂2 - - - 0.001 
TS 𝜂3 - - - 0.921 
TO 𝜂4 - - - 0.668 
Table 3:  Summary table financial parameters. Asterisk (*) marked parameters are significant at a 5 % level. 
5.2.1 Measurement model X 
Management profit, interest expense, operating costs, return on investment and administrative 
cost compared to lease value all have t-values above the critical threshold, strong loadings and 
low standard errors. The data indicates that the observed variables significantly affect financial 
measures-based performance evaluation. Furthermore, the variance of the error terms is 
significant. The financial measurement model X show stronger statistical results than the non-
financial model, with stronger standardized solutions and lower standard errors.  
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5.2.2 Measurement model Y 
The parameters of the observed variables, 𝜆𝑖𝑗
𝑦
, are significant, with strong standardized solutions 
and low standard errors. The variance of the error terms is significant, except for IJ2. 
Measurement model Y is unchanged compared to the non-financial measurement model Y, and 
the results are accordingly. 
5.2.3 Structural model 
The financial model share strong similarities with the non-financial model. The effect of 
financial measures-based performance evaluation on procedural justice and interactional justice 
is not significant. The effect of procedural justice on trust in superior is negative, and not 
significant. The effects of procedural justice and interactional justice on trust in organization 
are significant, with interactional justice explaining the majority of the variance. The effect of 
interactional justice on trust in superior is significant, with a standardized solution of 1.01. 
Generally, having effects above one, which in this case indicates that interactional justice 
explains 101 % of the variance of trust in superior, is considered a weakness, considering it is 
an impossibility. However, such a small discrepancy should not be problematic. The correlation 
between interactional and procedural justice is strong and significant. 
5.2.4 Standardized residuals 
Standardized residuals with an absolute value above 2 may indicate misfit. The largest 
standardized value in the data is |2.422|19. However, there is only one absolute value above 2, 
which may indicate an anomaly. A standardized variable have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1, no matter what the initial units were (Studenmund, 2011). Thus, a standardized 
residual have 5 % chance of being above |2|, and may be considered as an anomaly without 
consequences to data fit. It is noted, however, that the financial model on average have larger 
standardized values than the non-financial model, indicating a worse fit compared to the non-
financial model.  
                                                 
19 See appendix F2 for standardized residuals matrix. 
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5.2.5 Indirect effect 
The indirect effect of financial measures-based performance evaluation on trust in organization 
and trust in superior were calculated as follows: 
 
Trust in organization: 
Path (1)  FI-PJ-TO  0.17×0.33  0.0561 
Path (2)  FI-IJ-TO  0.03×0.57  0.0171 
Indirect effect        0.0732 
 
Trust in superior: 
Path (1)  FI-PJ-TS  0.17×-0.08  -0.0136 
Path (2)  FI-IJ-TS  0.03×1.01  0.0303 
Indirect effect        0.0167 
 
5.2.6 Model fit 
Goodness-of-fit measure Value Assessment 
Chi-square (C3) 162.675 Good fit 
Chi-square test (p-value) 0.0208 Rejects the model 
χ2/𝑑𝑓  1.271 Good fit 
Close-fit test (p-value) 0.0545 Acceptable fit 
RMSEA 0.0704 Acceptable fit 
SRMR 0.0589 Acceptable fit 
GFI 0.823 Bad fit 
AGFI 0.764 Bad fit 
CFI 0.958 Acceptable fit 
NFI 0.887 Bad fit 
Table 4: Goodness-of-fit statistics, financial model 
The chi-square test rejects the financial model, which indicates that the model-implied 
covariance matrix diverge from the empirical covariance matrix. The chi-square could be 
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reduced by opening correlation between the error terms of the financial performance indicator-
variables, as suggested by the theta-delta modification index. Although this would improve fit, 
there is not theoretical justification for freeing the covariation, and it should therefore remain 
fixed (Hooper et al., 2008). 
RMSEA, the close-fit test, SRMR and CFI indicates acceptable fit. GFI, AGFI and NFI indicate 
bad fit. The difference between NFI and GFI is 0.064. It is higher than the non-financial model, 
indicating a slightly higher degree of noise in the data. The only difference between the two 
models are the non-financial and the financial indicators; the non-financial model have slightly 
better goodness-of-fit indices, as well as being accepted by the chi-square test, indicating a 
stronger model. In conclusion, the financial model has an acceptable fit when the low sample 
size and multivariate non-normality is taken into account. 
5.2.7 Reliability 
The composite reliability and the average variance extracted measures were satisfactory20, 
being above 0.7 and 0.5 respectively. The r-squared of the observed variables are high, 
indicating good reliability. The financial variables have high reliability, except for management 
profit which is moderate. The reliability of the remaining observed variables are high. 
The same limitations afflicting the non-financial model trouble the financial model. The effect 
of financial measures-based performance evaluation on procedural and interactional justice is 
not significant, resulting in very low r-squared values, 0.029 and 0.001 respectively. The r-
squared of trust in organization is 0.668, equal to the non-financial model. The r-squared of 
trust in superior is 0.921, which is slightly higher than the non-financial model. 
Summed up, the reliability of the model is sound. The financial variables are strong, although 
less reliable than the justice and trust variables. The financial model is more reliable than the 
non-financial model, but the goodness of fit is worse. 
5.2.8 Validity 
The financial model suffers from the limitations plaguing the non-financial model. For a 
discussion of validity, see section 5.1.9. In conclusion, the model suffers from reduced construct 
                                                 
20 See appendix G. 
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validity. The KPI instrument suffers from low convergent validity, while interactional justice 
and trust in superior suffer from low discriminant validity.  
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the research problem is debated with respect to the empirical results, theory and 
previous research. In discussing the results, concerns of reliability and validity are emphasized. 
An alternative model is discussed, where a different interpretation of the KPI instrument is 
applied and the focus is shifted from financial and non-financial performance indicators to 
corporate strategy. Finally, a conclusion is offered and contributions of the research reviewed. 
6.1 Discussion of empirical results 
The empirical results found positive effects of both financial and non-financial measures-based 
performance evaluation on interactional and procedural justice, as hypothesized. However, the 
effects were not significant. Financial and non-financial indicators did not significantly explain 
variance in perceived justice. The direct effects of financial indicators on justice were weaker, 
indicating that non-financial performance measures are perceived as fairer vis-à-vis financial 
indicators. Especially the effect on interactional justice was markedly lower (from 0.21 to 0.03), 
indicating that non-financial indicators may be more open to interpretation and flexibility, 
facilitating communication between subordinate and superior, and a more just performance 
appraisal process. 
Procedural and interactional justice strongly and positively correlates, as hypothesized, 
indicating that the distinction between superior and the general leadership of the organization 
may be arbitrary. Employees may be unable to discern the accountable party with respect to 
procedures and interaction. However, it is noted how Colquitt et al. (2005) demonstrate that the 
instrument used (Moorman, 1991) often achieve high correlations. 
Regardless of whether financial or non-financial indicators were used, the results were 
significant, positive effects of procedural justice on trust in organization and of interactional 
justice on trust in superior and in organization. The effect of procedural justice on trust in 
superior was negative, contrary to the hypothesized positive effect, but insignificant. Thus, 
perceived fairness is associated with both trust in superior and in organization: Procedural 
justice is associated with trust in organization, and interactional justice is associated with both 
trust in superior and in organization, in accordance with the theoretical framework. Just 
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Figure 5: Path coefficients (non-financial model). Asterisk (*) marked coefficients are significant at a 5 % level. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Path coefficients (financial model). Asterisk (*) marked coefficients are significant at a 5 % level.  
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treatment influences individuals’ trust towards the accountable party; procedural justice is 
organization focused and interactional justice is supervisor focused. 
The effect of interactional justice is stronger than the effect of procedural justice on trust in 
organization. Spillover effects of this magnitude may indicate that the immediate superior’s 
treatment of subordinates may be more important in promoting trust in the top management of 
the organization than the fairness of the procedures set down by top management. Furthermore, 
it may indicate that employees’ anthropomorphize the leadership of the organization, projecting 
the immediate superior’s qualities on top management. Therefore, it might be that freeing the 
effect of trust in superior on trust in organization may better explain the relationship between 
justice and trust; however, the result was unsatisfactory21. Freeing correlation between the two 
trust constructs did not improve the results, although there is some support for such effects in 
management literature (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). 
Albeit the spillover effect was significant and strong in the case of interactional justice on trust 
in organization, the spillover effects are invariably lower in magnitude than the effect between 
target similar variables. The result is according to contemporary social exchange theory, 
indicating that individuals perceiving procedural justice reciprocate primarily towards the 
organization, and individuals experiencing interactional justice reciprocate primarily towards 
the superior. 
The research model presents how interactional justice perfectly explains trust in superior and 
how the constructs correlate exceedingly strong (0.956). Although previous literature have 
found strong effects of interactional justice on trust in superior and strong positive correlations 
between the constructs (see for instance Colquitt et al., 2012; Aryee et al., 2002; Wu et al., 
2011; Ertürk, 2007), the relationship has not been explicitly discussed. When interactional 
justice perfectly explains trust in superior, it indicates that the two constructs are identical. The 
exploratory factor analysis corroborates this assumption. This may be problematic as it infers 
that researchers research two constructs that may be more similar than anticipated, perhaps even 
to the point where there is no empirical distinction. A model with reversed effects (i.e. trust in 
superior affected interactional justice instead of the opposite) was conducted22, yielding a direct 
significant effect of 0.88; trust in superior explained 88 % of the variance in interactional justice 
while the correlation between interactional and procedural justice became insignificant and 0.11 
                                                 
21 See appendix F3. 
22 See appendix F4. 
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(from 0.56*). However, as this relationship has not previously been scrutinized, nor such strong 
effects achieved, it may indicate that the problem originates from the instruments applied. The 
instruments devised by Moorman (1991) and Read (1962), two instruments that hardly ever 
have been applied simultaneously, may be empirically very similar, although they attempt to 
measure two unique constructs. Therefore, they should be applied with caution. When used 
simultaneously, the empirical distinction between interactional justice and trust in superior may 
be tenuous. This may also infer complications when they are used alone, i.e. they might not 
measure the intended construct as well as anticipated. 
The indirect effect on trust depended heavily on whether non-financial or financial indicators 
were applied. The indirect effect of non-financial measures-based performance evaluation on 
trust in organization was 0.2022, and the indirect effect on trust in superior was 0.1900. The 
equivalent results for financial measures-based performance evaluation were 0.0732 and 
0.0167, respectively. Indirect effect values in excess of 0.05 can be considered meaningful, 
according to Pedhazur and Kerlinger (1982, p. 617) and Bartol (1983, p. 803). The impact of 
non-financial performance indicators on trust in superior and trust in organization is far above 
the meaningful threshold of 0.05. The impact of financial performance indicators on trust in 
organization is meaningful, although substantially lower than the impact of non-financial 
indicators. The impact of financial indicators on trust in superior is not meaningful. 
6.2 Alternative model 
As evidence by the exploratory factor analysis and the reliability and validity discussions, the 
KPI instrument is problematic. It did not conform to theory as expected. When the original 
instrument (Hoque et al., 2001) has been applied in previous research, it has been mailed to 
more than a hundred unique companies and used to categorize these companies based on usage 
of multiple performance measures. Moreover, the participants – the CEOs – of these studies 
found the instrument to be meaningful and relevant to the organization’s strategy (Hoque et al., 
2001). When applied within a single company, as in this thesis, and employees of different 
levels participate, the instrument does not categorize the company based on financial or non-
financial importance; it reflects the perceived importance of the different measures, most likely 
reflecting the organization’s chosen strategic vision. And the strategic vision of the company 
may not relate to financial and non-financial performance indicators as presumed in this thesis. 
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An exploratory factor analysis was conducted without dividing the sample into managers and 
non-managers and without forcing it to conform to theory. The result23 was four factors, of 
which two (factor 1 and 2, explaining 55.6 % of the variance) relate to the real estate company’s 
strategic vision, as elucidated in their annual corporate report. Factor 1 consisted of economic 
occupancy, new leases, renewal of existing leases and rents receivable, four variables relating 
to “leasing and property management”, which is one of three defined strategic aspects of the 
real estate company’s business model. Factor 2 comprised return on investment, number of 
environmentally certified properties, operating costs and number of green leases, which may 
relate to a second defined aspect of the business model, “development through investment”. 
The real estate company’s strategic focus is environmentally oriented, and the factor reflects 
green investments and the associated return and expense of this strategic vision. 
When the KPI instrument is aligned with the company’s strategy, it may work as intended. The 
latent variable “development through investment” significantly affected procedural justice24. It 
may be that employees’ feel fairly treated in the performance appraisal process when they feel 
that the performance measures reflecting the strategy and vision promulgated by top 
management are important. Therefore, a study should be undertaken using this approach; 
however, the focus shift away from financial/non-financial indicators involves an adjustment 
of the theoretical framework. 
It may be that e.g. environmental management accounting and environmental performance 
indicators illuminate relationships between the performance appraisal process and behaviour 
more clearly than financial and non-financial performance indicators. Little research focus on 
environmental management accounting and behavioural consequences, although Henri and 
Journeault (2010) note that ‘eco-control is used to guard against undesirable behaviour and to 
encourage desirable actions’ (p. 66) and that it ‘motivates people to align their behaviour with 
the environmental goals of the organization, and to exert additional effort, which in turn should 
improve environmental performance’ (p. 68). Moreover, employee morale and motivation is 
associated with an environmental strategy (Henri and Journeault, 2010; Epstein and Roy, 2001). 
The study could benefit from a refashioning, examining how the performance appraisal process 
is perceived with respect to organizational strategy and how it relates to behavioural aspects 
and organizational outcomes. 
                                                 
23 See appendix B4. 
24 See appendix F5. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
Usage of financial and non-financial performance indicators in performance evaluation did not 
significantly affect employees’ perceptions of organizational justice. Therefore, the conclusion 
that fair perceptions of performance evaluation associate with trust in superior and trust in 
organization cannot be made with certainty. Nor can it be concluded that justice mediates the 
effect of performance appraisal on trust. However, the indirect effects indicate that a change in 
the perceived importance of non-financial performance indicators in performance evaluation 
meaningfully affects trust in superior and organization through perceived justice, and that this 
effect is greater vis-à-vis an equal perceived change of the importance of financial performance 
indicators. Thus, it may seem that non-financial performance indicators are perceived as more 
just. 
When the KPI instrument is used to categorize an organization as financially or non-financially 
oriented, with respect to performance appraisal, it may not work as intended. When applied 
within a single company, it should relate to the organization’s strategy and vision. The 
perceived importance of performance measures most likely reflect management’s promulgated 
vision, which may not associate with a dichotomous financial or non-financial perspective. If, 
on the other hand, the goal is to categorize a multitude of organizations, the KPI instrument and 
the methodology developed by Hoque et al. (2001) works. 
6.4 Contributions of the study 
Performance measurement systems should reflect the organization’s vision and strategy. The 
alternative model demonstrates how performance measures associated with the organizational 
vision and strategy influences employees’ perceptions of justice, which in turn affects trust and, 
ultimately, performance. Whether the measures are financial or non-financial are of less 
importance, although it may seem that non-financial performance measures are perceived as 
more just. Moreover, an instrument tailored to fit the particular organization’s vision and 
strategy helps ensure reliable results. 
The instruments developed by William Read (1962) and Robert Moorman (1991) should be 
applied with caution. The empirical distinction between trust in superior and interactional 
justice as formulated by the authors may be insubstantial. 
Finally, the results from this study corroborates findings in previous literature. In accordance 
with social exchange theory and target similarity, it is demonstrated that procedural justice is 
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organizational-focused and interactional justice is supervisor-focused. Additionally, it is 
demonstrated how target-similar effects are stronger than spillover effects.  
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7. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
7.1 Limitations 
There are limitations associated with this study. First, a major weakness is the low sample size. 
Statistical analyses, especially with multivariate non-normality, desire several hundred 
respondents. This study had 104 after filtering by managers and unsatisfactory responses. 
Second, the alteration of the instruments may have influenced reliability and validity; never-
before used performance measures in the KPI instrument and translation of the other 
instruments may have led to loss of vital linguistic nuances. Reduced construct validity and 
reliability suggests that the empirical results cannot be made with certainty. Third, the division 
of the sample into non-managers may work favourably for the importance of non-financial 
indicators. The real estate company’s appraisal system of the blue-collar workers is more non-
financially oriented than the manager’s appraisal system, which may influence the result. 
Fourth, no control variables were applied in this study. How long an individual have worked in 
their current position or for their current superior is likely to affect for instance trust towards 
the organizational authorities. The importance of the design of the performance appraisal may 
be greatly reduced, with respect to trust, when these variables are controlled for. Finally, 
because the sample comprises one medium-sized real estate company, generalization should be 
done with caution. 
7.2 Suggestions for future research 
Future studies should continue to explore how the performance appraisal system affects 
behaviour. In this respect, the current study should be redone with the KPI instrument linked to 
organizational strategy and a corresponding theoretical framework.  
Future research could also benefit from focusing on interactional justice. The dominant justice 
constructs in research are procedural and distributive justice. However, it may seem like 
interactional justice play a vital part in forming individuals’ perceptions. The link between 
interactional justice and trust should be further explored. The empirical distinction between 
interactional justice and trust in superior should also be scrutinized further. 
Finally, organizational justice research should be approached with a more comprehensive use 
of the exchange rules of social exchange theory. It is unlikely that reciprocity fully explicates 
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human behaviour. Adding additional or focusing on different exchange rules should be 
explored.  
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Appendix A – The questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire comprising the original instruments, with priming, reverse-scored items and 
variable names used in SPSS/LISREL. 
 
R Q# D# #LIS
REL 
Original instrument (except the performance measurement instrument) 
    Performance measurement instruments - KPI 
Financial vs. non-financial indicators 
Hoque, Mia and Alam (2001) 
    When you discuss your performance with your superior, how important are the 
following indicators? (1 = not important at all, 7 = very important) 
 1 1 Manageme_income Management income 
 2 2 ROI Return on investment 
 3 3 Rent_receivable Outstanding rents receivable 
 4 4 Interest_expense Interest expenses 
 5 5 Operating_costs Operating costs 
 6 6 Economic_occupancy Economic occupancy rate 
 7 7 Adm.cost_to_lease.value Administrative costs compared to lease values 
 8 8 Customer_satisfaction Customer satisfaction index 
 9 9 New_leases Number of new leases 
 10 10 Renewal_leases Number of tenants who renew their contracts 
 11 11 Hours_inservice Hours of in-service education 
 12 12 Coworker_satisfaction Co-worker satisfaction index 
 13 13 Green_property Number of environmentally certified properties 
 14 14 Number_green_leases Number of green leases 
    Procedural justice 
Moorman (1991) 
    When you think of how your performance appraisal procedures are done at your 
company, how would you rate the following statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 
= strongly Agree) 
 15 1 PJ1 Procedures are designed to collect accurate information necessary for making 
decisions 
 16 2 PJ2 Procedures are designed to provide opportunities to appeal or challenge the 
decision 
 17 3 PJ3 Procedures are designed to have all sides affected by the decision represented 
 18 4 PJ4 Procedures are designed to generate standards so that decisions could be made with 
consistency 
 19 5 PJ5 Procedures are designed to hear the concerns of all those affected by the decision. 
 20 6 PJ6 Procedures are designed to provide useful feedback regarding the decision and its 
implementation. 
 21 7 PJ7 Procedures are designed to allow for requests for clarification 
    Distributive justice 
63 
 
Moorman (1991) 
    When you think about how you are rewarded at your company, how would you 
rate the following statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly Agree) 
 22 1  I am fairly rewarded considering the responsibilities I have 
 23 2  I am fairly rewarded in view of the amount of experience I have 
 24 3  I am fairly rewarded for the amount of effort I put forth 
 25 4  I am fairly rewarded for the work I have done well 
 26 5  I am fairly rewarded for the stresses and strains of my job 
    Interactional justice 
Moorman (1991) 
    When you think about how your supervisor evaluates your performance, how 
would you rate the following statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
Agree) 
 27 1 IJ1 My supervisor considers my viewpoints 
 28 2 IJ2 My supervisor is able to suppress personal biases 
 29 3 IJ3 My supervisor provides me with timely feedback about decision and their 
implications 
 30 4 IJ4 My supervisor treats me with kindness and consideration 
 31 5 IJ5 My supervisor shows concern for my rights as an employee 
 32 6 IJ6 My supervisor takes steps to deal with me in a truthful manner 
    Affective commitment towards organization 
Meyer and Allen (2001) 
    When you think about your organization, how would you rate the following 
statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 33 1  I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization 
 34 2  I really feel as if this organization’s problem are my own 
R 35 3  I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization 
R 36 4  I do not feel emotionally attached to this organization 
R 37 5  I do not feel like part of the “family” at my organization 
 38 6  This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me 
 39 7  I really feel an overall commitment to my organization 
    Affective commitment towards superior 
Meyer and Allen (2001) 
    When you think about your superior, how would you rate the following 
statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 40 1  I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career under the guidance of my 
supervisor  
 41 2  I really feel as if my supervisor’s problems are my own 
R 42 3  I do not feel a strong sense of connection to my supervisor 
R 43 4  I do not feel emotionally attached to my supervisor 
R 44 5  I do not feel like part of the “family” of my supervisor 
 45 6  My supervisor has a great deal of personal meaning for me 
 46 7  I really feel an overall commitment to my supervisor 
    Trust in supervisor 
Read (1962) 
    When you think about your superior, how would you rate the following 
statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 47 1 TS1 Your superior takes advantage of opportunities to further your interest 
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 48 2 TS2 You feel free to discuss with your superior the problems and difficulties in your 
job without jeopardizing your position 
 49 3 TS3 You feel confident that your superior keeps you fully and frankly informed 
 50 4 TS4 You feel confident that your superior’s decisions are justified, even when they 
seem to go against your interests   
    Organizational trust 
Robinson (1994, 1996) 
    When you think about your organization, how would you rate the following 
statements? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
R 51 1 TO1 I am not sure I fully trust my employer  
 52 2 TO2 My employer is open and upfront with me. 
 53 3 TO3 I believe my employer has high integrity. 
 54 4 TO4 In general, I believe my employer's motives and intentions are good  
R 55 5 TO5 My employer is not always honest and truthful 
R 56 6  I don’t think my employer treats me fairly 
 57 7 TO6 I can expect my employer to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion 
    Managerial performance – sub dimensions 
Mahoney et al. (1965) 
    How would you rate your performance in the following areas? (1 = very low, 7 =  
very high) 
 58 1  Planning (Determining goals, policies and course of action, work scheduling, 
budgeting, setting up procedures, setting goals or standards, preparing agendas, 
projects/programs) 
 59 2  Investigating (Collecting and preparing information, inventorying, measuring 
output, preparing financial statements, recordkeeping, performing research, job 
analysis) 
 60 3  Coordinating (Exchanging information with people in the organization other than 
subordinates in order to relate and adjust programs, advising ot 
her departments, expediting, liaison with other managers, arranging meetings, 
informing superiors, seeking other departments’ cooperation 
 61 4  Evaluating (Assessment and appraisal of proposals or of reported or observed 
performance, employee appraisals, judging output records, judging financial 
reports, product inspection, approving requests, judging proposals and 
suggestions)  
 62 5  Supervising (Directing, leading, and developing subordinates, counselling 
subordinates, training subordinates, explaining work rules, assigning work, 
disciplining, handling of complaints of subordinates) 
 63 6  Staffing (Maintaining the work force of a unit or of several units. Recruiting, 
employment interviewing, selecting employees, placing employees, promoting 
employees, transferring employees) 
 64 7  Negotiating (Purchasing, selling or contracting for goods or services. Tax 
negotiations, contacting suppliers, dealing with sales representatives, advertising 
products, collective bargaining, selling to dealers or customers) 
 65 8  Representing (Advancing general organizational interests through speeches, 
consultation and contacts with individuals or groups outside the organization. 
Public speeches, community drives, news releases, attending conventions, 
business club meetings) 
    Managerial performance – overall 
Mahoney et al. (1965) 
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 66 1  How would you rate your overall performance? (1 = very low, 7 = very high) 
    Job satisfaction 
Rusbult and Farrell (1983) 
 67 1  All things considered, how satisfied are you with your current job? (1 = not at all 
satisfied, 9 = extremely satisfied) 
 68 2  In general, how much do you like your job? (1 = don't like it at all, 9 = like it very 
much) 
 69 3  Knowing what you now know, if you had to decide all over again whether to take 
the job you now have, what would you decide? (1 = definitely would not take this 
job, 9 = would take this job without hesitation) 
 70 4  If a good friend of yours told you that he/she was interested in working in a job 
like yours for your employer, what would you tell him/her? (1 = advise against it, 
9 = strongly recommend it) 
 71 5  How does this job compare to your ideal job? (1 = far from ideal, 9 = close to ideal) 
 72 6  How does your job measure up to the sort of job you wanted when you took it? (1 
= not at all like the job I wanted, 9 = very much like the job I wanted) 
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Appendix B – Exploratory factor analyses 
 
B1. Exploratory factor analysis of procedural justice, interactional justice, trust in superior and 
trust in organization. 
KMO and Bartlett's Test  Factor Correlation Matrix 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy. ,947 
 Factor 1 2 3 
Bartlett's Test 
of Sphericity 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 3600,702  
1 
1,000 ,726 ,588 
df 253  2 ,726 1,000 ,615 
Sig. 0,000  3 ,588 ,615 1,000 
    
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.   
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Communalities  Pattern Matrix
a 
  Initial Extraction  
  
Factor 
PJ1 ,697 ,641  1 2 3 
PJ2 ,614 ,545  IJ4 ,950     
PJ3 ,801 ,823  TS2 ,940     
PJ4 ,774 ,701  TS3 ,905     
PJ5 ,730 ,716  IJ6 ,893     
PJ6 ,709 ,708  IJ2 ,854     
PJ7 ,605 ,556  IJ1 ,854     
IJ1 ,860 ,816  IJ3 ,821     
IJ2 ,840 ,781  TS1 ,804     
IJ3 ,809 ,740  IJ5 ,773     
IJ4 ,896 ,851  TS4 ,697     
IJ5 ,896 ,829  TO4   ,953   
IJ6 ,871 ,778  TO3   ,945   
TS1 ,818 ,700  TO5   ,910   
TS2 ,846 ,835  TO1   ,900   
TS3 ,892 ,849  TO2   ,833   
TS4 ,859 ,794  TO6   ,775   
TO1 ,923 ,916  PJ6     ,868 
TO2 ,914 ,875  PJ3     ,855 
TO3 ,886 ,863  PJ5     ,812 
TO4 ,906 ,896  PJ2     ,801 
TO5 ,906 ,910  PJ7     ,793 
TO6 ,750 ,679  PJ4     ,689 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis 
Factoring.  
PJ1 
    ,629 
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Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 
14,435 62,763 62,763 14,230 61,869 61,869 12,529 
2 
2,445 10,630 73,393 2,156 9,372 71,241 11,574 
3 
1,599 6,950 80,343 1,419 6,169 77,409 9,518 
4 
,621 2,701 83,044         
5 
,554 2,410 85,454         
6 
,481 2,092 87,546         
7 
,386 1,677 89,223         
8 
,349 1,518 90,741         
9 
,334 1,451 92,192         
10 
,251 1,091 93,283         
11 
,216 ,940 94,223         
12 
,190 ,828 95,051         
13 
,186 ,811 95,861         
14 
,159 ,691 96,552         
15 
,137 ,594 97,146         
16 
,130 ,566 97,712         
17 
,126 ,548 98,261         
18 
,092 ,401 98,661         
19 
,074 ,321 98,983         
20 
,069 ,302 99,285         
21 
,064 ,280 99,564         
22 
,051 ,223 99,787         
23 
,049 ,213 100,000         
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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B2. Exploratory factor analysis of the KPI instrument. 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test  Factor Correlation Matrix 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. ,793 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
475,354 
 
1 
1,000 ,403 ,427 ,575 
df 55  
2 ,403 1,000 ,297 ,247 
Sig. ,000  
3 ,427 ,297 1,000 ,327 
    
4 ,575 ,247 ,327 1,000 
    
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.   
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Communalities  Pattern Matrix
a 
  Initial Extraction  
  
Factor 
Renewal_leases 
,515 ,511 
 1 2 3 4 
Management_result 
,619 ,698 
 
Operating_cost 
,887       
Customer_satisfacti
on ,581 ,896 
 
Green_property 
,736       
Interest_expense 
,486 ,644 
 
ROI 
,667 -,335     
Operating_cost 
,644 ,805 
 
Management_result 
,630       
New_leases 
,381 ,503 
 
Customer_satisfaction 
  ,919     
Adm.cost_to_lease
_value ,470 ,538 
 
Coworker_satisfaction 
  ,541     
Hours_inservice 
,430 ,550 
 
Hours_inservice 
    ,725   
Green_property 
,517 ,550 
 
Interest_expense 
    ,674   
Coworker_satisfacti
on ,385 ,357 
 
Adm.cost_to_lease_valu
e     ,594   
ROI ,466 ,610  
New_leases       ,721 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
Renewal_leases 
      ,433 
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Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 4,501 40,921 40,921 4,135 37,588 37,588 3,431 
2 1,368 12,440 53,361 1,004 9,124 46,713 2,303 
3 1,312 11,926 65,287 ,940 8,550 55,263 2,369 
4 1,004 9,126 74,413 ,582 5,291 60,554 2,361 
5 ,686 6,232 80,645         
6 ,570 5,185 85,830         
7 ,399 3,631 89,460         
8 ,350 3,180 92,640         
9 ,325 2,959 95,599         
10 ,257 2,333 97,932         
11 ,228 2,068 100,000         
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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B3. Forced 2-factor exploratory analysis of trust in superior and interactional justice. 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test  Factor Correlation Matrix 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. ,899 
 Factor 1 2 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-
Square 882,355  
1 
1,000 ,803 
df 15  
2 ,803 1,000 
Sig. 
,000 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.   
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
       
Communalities  Pattern Matrix
a 
  Initial Extraction  
  
Factor 
IJ4 ,871 ,909  1 2 
IJ5 ,870 ,907  
IJ6 ,924   
IJ6 ,841 ,884  IJ5 ,850   
TS1 ,634 ,671  IJ4 ,842   
TS3 ,843 ,888  TS4   ,906 
TS4 ,802 ,880  
TS1   ,766 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
TS3   ,738 
    
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
    a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 4,948 82,474 82,474 4,812 80,207 80,207 4,434 
2 ,497 8,276 90,750 ,325 5,420 85,627 4,305 
3 ,243 4,048 94,798         
4 ,126 2,103 96,901         
5 ,100 1,667 98,568         
6 ,086 1,432 100,000         
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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B4. Unguided exploratory factor analysis of the KPI instrument. 
 
 
  
KMO and Bartlett's Test  Factor Correlation Matrix 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. ,835  Factor 1 2 3 4 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. 
Chi-
Square 
862,517 
 
1 
1,000 ,622 ,559 ,461 
df 78  
2 ,622 1,000 ,588 ,407 
Sig. ,000  
3 ,559 ,588 1,000 ,433 
    
4 ,461 ,407 ,433 1,000 
    
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.   
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Communalities  Pattern Matrix
a 
  Initial 
Extractio
n  
  
Factor 
Renewal_leases 
,652 ,620 
 1 2 3 4 
Rent_receivable 
,646 ,585 
 
Econonic_occupan
cy ,793       
Hours_inservice 
,414 ,465 
 
New_leases 
,779       
Green_property 
,605 ,616 
 
Renewal_leases 
,600       
Customer_satisfaction 
,590 ,939 
 
Rent_receivable 
,569       
Interest_expense 
,544 ,643 
 
ROI 
  ,805     
Operating_costs 
,637 ,650 
 
Green_property 
  ,741     
ROI 
,548 ,628 
 
Operating_costs 
  ,665     
Green_leases 
,637 ,591 
 
Green_leases 
  ,580     
New_leases 
,565 ,586 
 
Adm.cost_to_leave
.value     ,722   
Coworker_satisfaction 
,518 ,379 
 
Hours_inservice 
    ,696   
Econonic_occupancy 
,613 ,682 
 
Interest_expense 
    ,651   
Adm.cost_to_leave.valu
e ,520 ,578  
Customer_satisfact
ion       ,938 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
Coworker_satisfact
ion       ,508 
   
 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
    a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
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Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 5,956 45,816 45,816 5,582 42,936 42,936 4,362 
2 1,275 9,807 55,623 ,934 7,186 50,122 4,271 
3 1,143 8,789 64,412 ,756 5,812 55,934 3,720 
4 1,070 8,233 72,645 ,689 5,303 61,237 2,979 
5 ,826 6,355 79,000         
6 ,570 4,383 83,383         
7 ,542 4,167 87,550         
8 ,393 3,027 90,577         
9 ,312 2,401 92,977         
10 ,267 2,052 95,029         
11 ,256 1,972 97,002         
12 ,214 1,644 98,646         
13 ,176 1,354 100,000         
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix C – Tests of univariate and multivariate normality 
 
Total Sample Size(N) =    104 
 
 
 Test of Univariate Normality for Continuous Variables 
 
              Skewness         Kurtosis      Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
 Variable Z-Score P-Value   Z-Score P-Value   Chi-Square P-Value 
 
 Renewal_  -3.792   0.000     0.470   0.639       14.603   0.001 
 Rent_rec  -2.884   0.004    -2.183   0.029       13.087   0.001 
 Hours_in   0.367   0.713    -4.851   0.000       23.665   0.000 
 Green_pr  -0.756   0.450    -3.187   0.001       10.731   0.005 
 Manageme  -5.294   0.000     3.655   0.000       41.387   0.000 
 Customer  -5.863   0.000     4.081   0.000       51.032   0.000 
 Interest  -0.592   0.554   -10.931   0.000      119.830   0.000 
 Operatin  -4.349   0.000     1.731   0.083       21.907   0.000 
      ROI  -3.856   0.000     0.734   0.463       15.411   0.000 
 Number_g  -0.306   0.760    -5.177   0.000       26.891   0.000 
 New_leas  -3.418   0.001     0.320   0.749       11.784   0.003 
 Coworker  -4.864   0.000     2.698   0.007       30.938   0.000 
 Economic  -3.059   0.002    -0.003   0.998        9.358   0.009 
 Adm.cost  -1.180   0.238    -4.512   0.000       21.751   0.000 
      PJ1  -2.033   0.042     0.667   0.505        4.578   0.101 
      PJ2  -0.679   0.497    -0.208   0.835        0.504   0.777 
      PJ3  -1.607   0.108     0.054   0.957        2.585   0.275 
      PJ4  -2.388   0.017     0.826   0.409        6.385   0.041 
      PJ5   0.563   0.573    -0.620   0.536        0.701   0.704 
      PJ6   0.257   0.797    -0.543   0.587        0.360   0.835 
      PJ7   0.526   0.599     0.574   0.566        0.606   0.739 
      IJ1  -4.853   0.000     2.667   0.008       30.669   0.000 
      IJ2  -5.103   0.000     2.910   0.004       34.509   0.000 
      IJ3  -3.362   0.001     1.066   0.286       12.443   0.002 
      IJ4  -6.219   0.000     4.227   0.000       56.543   0.000 
      IJ5  -6.271   0.000     4.424   0.000       58.894   0.000 
      IJ6  -6.840   0.000     4.718   0.000       69.046   0.000 
      TS1  -3.783   0.000     1.023   0.306       15.356   0.000 
      TS2  -5.524   0.000     3.165   0.002       40.528   0.000 
      TS3  -4.532   0.000     1.601   0.109       23.098   0.000 
      TS4  -4.872   0.000     2.076   0.038       28.048   0.000 
      TO1  -5.678   0.000     3.845   0.000       47.020   0.000 
      TO2  -5.328   0.000     3.499   0.000       40.631   0.000 
      TO3  -5.135   0.000     3.147   0.002       36.274   0.000 
      TO4  -6.356   0.000     4.678   0.000       62.279   0.000 
      TO5  -6.104   0.000     4.212   0.000       54.999   0.000 
      TO6  -6.994   0.000     5.098   0.000       74.908   0.000 
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 Relative Multivariate Kurtosis = 1.090 
 
 Test of Multivariate Normality for Continuous Variables 
 
Skewness                  Kurtosis                   Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
Value   Z-Score P-Value   Value    Z-Score P-Value   Chi-Square P-Value 
------- ------- -------   -------- ------- -------   ---------- ------- 
698.710 19.960  0.000     1572.353 8.652   0.000     473.255    0.000  
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Appendix D – Multicollinearity
76 
 
Appendix E – Correlation matrices 
E1. Correlation matrix of financial and non-financial performance indicators. 
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E2. Correlation matrix of procedural and interactional justice, trust in superior and trust in 
organization. 
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Appendix F – LISREL path model (standardized solutions) and output 
F1. The robust non-financial model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                DATE:  4/28/2015 
                                  TIME:  9:55 
 
 
                          L I S R E L  9.20 (32 Bit) 
 
                                       BY 
 
                         Karl G. Jöreskog & Dag Sörbom 
 
 
 
                    This program is published exclusively by 
                    Scientific Software International, Inc. 
                         http://www.ssicentral.com 
 
        Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981-2014 
          Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in the 
                        Universal Copyright Convention. 
 
 The following lines were read from file C:\Users\Jakob\Desktop\DATA_final\Real 
deal\NFI_5.lpj: 
 
 Robust Non-financial Model 
 DA NI=17 NO=104 MA=CM 
 RA FI='C:\Users\Jakob\Desktop\DATA_final\Real deal\DATA_BRUK_5.lsf' 
 SE 
 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1 2 3 4 / 
 MO NX=4 NY=13 NK=1 NE=4 BE=FU,FI GA=FU,FI PS=SY,FR TE=DI,FR TD=DI,FR 
 
 
 MO NX=4 NY=13 NK=1 NE=4 BE=FU,FI GA=FU,FI PS=SY,FR TE=DI,FR TD=DI,FR 
 LE 
 PJ IJ TS TO 
 LK 
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 NFI 
 FR LY(1,1) LY(2,1) LY(3,1) LY(4,1) LY(5,1) LY(6,2) LY(7,2) LY(8,3) LY(9,3) 
 FR LY(10,4) LY(11,4) LY(12,4) LY(13,4) LX(1,1) LX(2,1) LX(3,1) LX(4,1) BE(3,1) 
 FR BE(3,2) BE(4,1) BE(4,2) GA(1,1) GA(2,1) 
 FI PS(1,3) PS(1,4) PS(2,3) PS(2,4) PS(3,4) 
 PD 
 RO 
 OU MI RS FT 
 
 Robust Non-financial Model                                                      
 
                           Number of Input Variables 17 
                           Number of Y - Variables   13 
                           Number of X - Variables    4 
                           Number of ETA - Variables  4 
                           Number of KSI - Variables  1 
                           Number of Observations   104 
 
 Robust Non-financial Model                                                      
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      1.671 
      PJ2      0.964      1.768 
      PJ3      1.220      1.286      1.881 
      PJ4      1.220      0.958      1.337      1.738 
      PJ6      1.034      1.148      1.366      1.209      1.804 
      IJ2      0.871      0.662      0.935      0.844      0.688      1.963 
      IJ5      0.853      0.510      0.811      0.826      0.624      1.295 
      TS2      0.764      0.569      0.914      0.811      0.786      1.541 
      TS3      0.914      0.583      1.007      0.848      0.841      1.661 
      TO1      0.938      0.659      0.997      1.003      0.839      1.102 
      TO3      0.821      0.580      0.920      0.971      0.798      0.958 
      TO5      0.936      0.700      1.013      1.046      0.763      1.141 
      TO6      0.858      0.586      0.780      0.777      0.597      0.807 
 Renewal_      0.515     -0.004      0.472      0.504      0.217     -0.094 
 Customer      0.200     -0.034      0.072      0.176      0.149     -0.004 
 New_leas      0.440      0.083      0.376      0.280      0.430      0.361 
 Coworker      0.444      0.142      0.545      0.490      0.271      0.473 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      1.483 
      TS2      1.421      2.077 
      TS3      1.575      1.945      2.481 
      TO1      1.113      1.116      1.330      1.621 
      TO3      0.963      0.952      1.130      1.341      1.455 
      TO5      1.101      1.127      1.243      1.496      1.358      1.621 
      TO6      0.873      0.733      0.968      1.162      1.010      1.119 
 Renewal_      0.130      0.099      0.007      0.080      0.279      0.153 
 Customer      0.234     -0.071      0.017      0.136      0.181      0.088 
 New_leas      0.486      0.378      0.440      0.105      0.118      0.128 
 Coworker      0.548      0.398      0.576      0.300      0.282      0.253 
 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 TO6   Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      1.369 
 Renewal_     -0.028      3.955 
 Customer      0.134      0.810      1.814 
 New_leas     -0.066      1.848      1.055      3.075 
 Coworker      0.393      1.040      1.016      0.747      2.427 
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 Total Variance = 34.204 Generalized Variance = 0.0221                                   
 
 Largest Eigenvalue = 14.278 Smallest Eigenvalue = 0.096                                    
 
 Condition Number = 12.186 
 
 
 Parameter Specifications 
 
         LAMBDA-Y     
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO 
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1          0          0          0          0 
      PJ2          1          0          0          0 
      PJ3          2          0          0          0 
      PJ4          3          0          0          0 
      PJ6          4          0          0          0 
      IJ2          0          0          0          0 
      IJ5          0          5          0          0 
      TS2          0          0          0          0 
      TS3          0          0          6          0 
      TO1          0          0          0          0 
      TO3          0          0          0          7 
      TO5          0          0          0          8 
      TO6          0          0          0          9 
 
         LAMBDA-X     
 
                 NFI 
            -------- 
 Renewal_         10 
 Customer         11 
 New_leas         12 
 Coworker         13 
 
         BETA         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO 
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ          0          0          0          0 
       IJ          0          0          0          0 
       TS         14         15          0          0 
       TO         16         17          0          0 
 
         GAMMA        
 
                 NFI 
            -------- 
       PJ         18 
       IJ         19 
       TS          0 
       TO          0 
         PSI          
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO 
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ         20 
       IJ         21         22 
       TS          0          0         23 
       TO          0          0          0         24 
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2 
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
                  25         26         27         28         29         30 
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         THETA-EPS    
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5 
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
                  31         32         33         34         35         36 
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 TO6 
            -------- 
                  37 
 
         THETA-DELTA  
 
            Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker 
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
                  38         39         40         41 
 
 Number of Iterations = 15           
 
 LISREL Estimates (Robust Maximum Likelihood)                     
 
         LAMBDA-Y     
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      1.026       - -        - -        - -  
  
      PJ2      0.968       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.129) 
               7.526 
  
      PJ3      1.231       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.103) 
              11.960 
  
      PJ4      1.113       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.105) 
              10.604 
  
      PJ6      1.082       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.113) 
               9.552 
  
      IJ2       - -       1.177       - -        - -  
  
      IJ5       - -       1.122       - -        - -  
                        (0.102) 
                         10.972 
  
      TS2       - -        - -       1.325       - -  
  
      TS3       - -        - -       1.467       - -  
                                   (0.091) 
                                    16.075 
  
      TO1       - -        - -        - -       1.225 
  
      TO3       - -        - -        - -       1.101 
                                              (0.081) 
                                               13.507 
  
      TO5       - -        - -        - -       1.223 
                                              (0.059) 
                                               20.845 
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      TO6       - -        - -        - -       0.930 
                                              (0.128) 
                                                7.257 
 
         LAMBDA-X     
 
                 NFI    
            -------- 
 Renewal_      1.266 
             (0.215) 
               5.894 
  
 Customer      0.836 
             (0.245) 
               3.416 
  
 New_leas      1.246 
             (0.187) 
               6.653 
  
 Coworker      0.853 
             (0.220) 
               3.883 
  
 
         BETA         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
  
       IJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
  
       TS     -0.078      1.004       - -        - -  
             (0.060)    (0.092) 
              -1.306     10.946 
  
       TO      0.334      0.569       - -        - -  
             (0.085)    (0.131) 
               3.942      4.336 
  
 
         GAMMA        
 
                 NFI    
            -------- 
       PJ      0.251 
             (0.150) 
               1.669 
  
       IJ      0.209 
             (0.176) 
               1.183 
  
       TS       - -  
  
       TO       - -  
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         Covariance Matrix of ETA and KSI         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO        NFI    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ      1.000 
       IJ      0.614      1.000 
       TS      0.538      0.956      1.000 
       TO      0.683      0.774      0.723      1.000 
      NFI      0.251      0.209      0.190      0.202      1.000 
 
         PHI          
 
                 NFI    
            -------- 
               1.000 
  
 
         PSI          
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ      0.937 
             (0.236) 
               3.977 
  
       IJ      0.561      0.956 
             (0.194)    (0.250) 
               2.889      3.829 
  
       TS       - -        - -       0.082 
                                   (0.045) 
                                     1.814 
  
       TO       - -        - -        - -       0.332 
                                              (0.088) 
                                                3.777 
  
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Equations   
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.063      0.044      0.918      0.668 
 
 NOTE: R² for Structural Equatios are Hayduk's (2006) Blocked-Error R² 
 
         Reduced Form                 
 
                 NFI    
            -------- 
       PJ      0.251 
             (0.151) 
               1.661 
  
       IJ      0.209 
             (0.177) 
               1.177 
  
       TS      0.190 
             (0.171) 
               1.111
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       TO      0.202 
             (0.144) 
               1.410 
  
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Reduced Form           
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.063      0.044      0.036      0.041 
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.618      0.831      0.366      0.499      0.635      0.578 
             (0.134)    (0.170)    (0.080)    (0.103)    (0.132)    (0.323) 
               4.619      4.890      4.578      4.852      4.790      1.788 
  
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.223      0.321      0.328      0.121      0.244      0.124 
             (0.049)    (0.095)    (0.104)    (0.039)    (0.057)    (0.037) 
               4.550      3.381      3.138      3.088      4.306      3.397 
  
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
               0.503 
             (0.127) 
               3.972 
  
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Y - Variables          
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.630      0.530      0.806      0.713      0.648      0.706 
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Y - Variables          
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.849      0.846      0.868      0.925      0.833      0.923 
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Y - Variables          
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
               0.632 
 
         THETA-DELTA  
 
            Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               2.353      1.115      1.523      1.699 
             (0.528)    (0.235)    (0.351)    (0.313) 
               4.459      4.750      4.340      5.423 
  
         Squared Multiple Correlations for X - Variables          
 
            Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.405      0.386      0.505      0.300 
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                                 Log-likelihood Values 
 
                        Estimated Model          Saturated Model 
                        ---------------          --------------- 
 Number of free parameters(t)        41                      153 
 -2ln(L)                       1539.871                 1371.383 
 AIC (Akaike, 1974)*           1621.871                 1677.383 
 BIC (Schwarz, 1978)*          1730.291                 2081.974 
 
*LISREL uses AIC= 2t - 2ln(L) and BIC = tln(N)- 2ln(L) 
 
 
                           Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
 
 Degrees of Freedom for (C1)-(C3)                      112 
 Maximum Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square (C1)              168.488 (P = 0.0004) 
 Browne's (1984) ADF Chi-Square (C2_NT)                158.914 (P = 0.0024) 
 Satorra-Bentler (1988) Scaled Chi-Square (C3)         136.774 (P = 0.0558) 
 Satorra-Bentler (1988) Adjusted Chi-Square (C4)       28.073 (P = 0.2125) 
 Degrees of Freedom for C4                             22.988 
  
 Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP)              56.488 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP                (25.527 ; 95.420) 
  
 Minimum Fit Function Value                            1.620 
 Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0)            0.543 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0                 (0.245 ; 0.917) 
 Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)       0.0696 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA              (0.0468 ; 0.0905) 
 P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05)          0.0748 
  
 Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI)                2.409 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI               (2.111 ; 2.783) 
 ECVI for Saturated Model                              2.942 
 ECVI for Independence Model                           15.342 
  
 Chi-Square for Independence Model (136 df)        1561.609 
  
 Normed Fit Index (NFI)                                0.892 
 Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI)                           0.952 
 Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI)                     0.735 
 Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                           0.960 
 Incremental Fit Index (IFI)                           0.961 
 Relative Fit Index (RFI)                              0.869 
  
 Critical N (CN)                                      92.531 
  
  
 Root Mean Square Residual (RMR)                       0.133 
 Standardized RMR                                      0.0624 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)                           0.848 
 Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)                 0.792 
 Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI)                0.620 
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         Fitted Covariance Matrix 
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      1.671 
      PJ2      0.994      1.768 
      PJ3      1.263      1.192      1.881 
      PJ4      1.142      1.078      1.370      1.738 
      PJ6      1.110      1.047      1.331      1.204      1.804 
      IJ2      0.741      0.699      0.889      0.804      0.781      1.963 
      IJ5      0.707      0.667      0.848      0.766      0.745      1.321 
      TS2      0.732      0.691      0.878      0.794      0.771      1.492 
      TS3      0.810      0.765      0.972      0.879      0.854      1.651 
      TO1      0.858      0.810      1.029      0.931      0.904      1.115 
      TO3      0.771      0.728      0.925      0.836      0.813      1.002 
      TO5      0.857      0.809      1.028      0.929      0.903      1.114 
      TO6      0.652      0.615      0.782      0.707      0.687      0.847 
 Renewal_      0.326      0.308      0.391      0.354      0.344      0.311 
 Customer      0.216      0.203      0.259      0.234      0.227      0.205 
 New_leas      0.321      0.303      0.385      0.348      0.338      0.306 
 Coworker      0.220      0.208      0.264      0.238      0.232      0.210 
 
         Fitted Covariance Matrix 
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      1.483 
      TS2      1.422      2.077 
      TS3      1.575      1.945      2.481 
      TO1      1.063      1.174      1.300      1.621 
      TO3      0.956      1.055      1.168      1.348      1.455 
      TO5      1.062      1.173      1.298      1.498      1.346      1.621 
      TO6      0.808      0.892      0.987      1.139      1.024      1.138 
 Renewal_      0.296      0.318      0.353      0.314      0.282      0.313 
 Customer      0.196      0.210      0.233      0.207      0.186      0.207 
 New_leas      0.292      0.313      0.347      0.309      0.278      0.309 
 Coworker      0.200      0.215      0.238      0.212      0.190      0.211 
 
         Fitted Covariance Matrix 
 
                 TO6   Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      1.369 
 Renewal_      0.238      3.955 
 Customer      0.158      1.059      1.814 
 New_leas      0.235      1.577      1.042      3.075 
 Coworker      0.161      1.080      0.714      1.063      2.427 
 
         Fitted Residuals 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      0.000 
      PJ2     -0.030      0.000 
      PJ3     -0.043      0.094      0.000 
      PJ4      0.078     -0.120     -0.033      0.000 
      PJ6     -0.076      0.101      0.035      0.006      0.000 
      IJ2      0.130     -0.037      0.046      0.040     -0.093      0.000 
      IJ5      0.146     -0.157     -0.037      0.059     -0.121     -0.026 
      TS2      0.033     -0.122      0.036      0.017      0.014      0.049 
      TS3      0.104     -0.181      0.035     -0.031     -0.013      0.010 
      TO1      0.080     -0.150     -0.033      0.072     -0.066     -0.013 
      TO3      0.050     -0.147     -0.005      0.134     -0.015     -0.044 
      TO5      0.079     -0.109     -0.015      0.116     -0.140      0.027 
      TO6      0.206     -0.030     -0.002      0.070     -0.090     -0.040 
 Renewal_      0.189     -0.312      0.081      0.150     -0.127     -0.405 
 Customer     -0.016     -0.237     -0.187     -0.057     -0.079     -0.210 
 New_leas      0.119     -0.220     -0.009     -0.069      0.092      0.055 
 Coworker      0.224     -0.066      0.281      0.252      0.039      0.263 
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         Fitted Residuals 
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      0.000 
      TS2     -0.001      0.000 
      TS3      0.001      0.000      0.000 
      TO1      0.049     -0.058      0.030      0.000 
      TO3      0.008     -0.103     -0.038     -0.007      0.000 
      TO5      0.039     -0.046     -0.055     -0.002      0.012      0.000 
      TO6      0.066     -0.159     -0.020      0.023     -0.014     -0.019 
 Renewal_     -0.166     -0.220     -0.345     -0.234     -0.003     -0.160 
 Customer      0.038     -0.282     -0.216     -0.072     -0.005     -0.120 
 New_leas      0.194      0.064      0.092     -0.203     -0.159     -0.181 
 Coworker      0.348      0.183      0.338      0.089      0.092      0.042 
 
         Fitted Residuals 
 
                 TO6   Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      0.000 
 Renewal_     -0.267      0.000 
 Customer     -0.023     -0.249      0.000 
 New_leas     -0.301      0.272      0.013      0.000 
 Coworker      0.232     -0.040      0.302     -0.316      0.000 
 
 Summary Statistics for Fitted Residuals 
 
 Smallest Fitted Residual =   -0.405 
   Median Fitted Residual =    0.000 
  Largest Fitted Residual =    0.348 
 
 Stemleaf Plot 
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         Standardized Residuals   
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      0.000 
      PJ2     -0.135      0.000 
      PJ3     -0.196      0.411      0.000 
      PJ4      0.350     -0.572     -0.149      0.000 
      PJ6     -0.358      0.675      0.166      0.025      0.000 
      IJ2      0.523     -0.162      0.186      0.144     -0.449      0.000 
      IJ5      0.570     -0.973     -0.159      0.230     -0.598     -0.084 
      TS2      0.125     -0.536      0.226      0.074      0.059      0.138 
      TS3      0.397     -0.773      0.220     -0.113     -0.057      0.036 
      TO1      0.303     -0.706     -0.129      0.271     -0.355     -0.040 
      TO3      0.229     -0.757     -0.024      0.587     -0.080     -0.162 
      TO5      0.358     -0.447     -0.061      0.406     -0.665      0.090 
      TO6      0.735     -0.173     -0.011      0.259     -0.447     -0.133 
 Renewal_      0.702     -1.338      0.277      0.587     -0.479     -1.440 
 Customer     -0.061     -1.398     -0.749     -0.220     -0.373     -0.835 
 New_leas      0.531     -1.089     -0.034     -0.269      0.399      0.208 
 Coworker      0.952     -0.350      1.139      1.054      0.167      0.973 
 
         Standardized Residuals   
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      0.000 
      TS2     -0.002      0.000 
      TS3      0.002      0.000      0.000 
      TO1      0.135     -0.175      0.085      0.000 
      TO3      0.025     -0.366     -0.133     -0.022      0.000 
      TO5      0.115     -0.126     -0.155     -0.005      0.037      0.000 
      TO6      0.177     -0.479     -0.058      0.062     -0.043     -0.050 
 Renewal_     -0.634     -0.913     -1.027     -0.812     -0.012     -0.537 
 Customer      0.127     -1.157     -0.690     -0.231     -0.016     -0.398 
 New_leas      0.813      0.228      0.266     -0.714     -0.540     -0.677 
 Coworker      1.197      0.655      0.990      0.290      0.319      0.144 
 
         Standardized Residuals   
 
                 TO6   Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      0.000 
 Renewal_     -1.054      0.000 
 Customer     -0.076     -0.597      0.000 
 New_leas     -1.202      0.617      0.046       - -  
 Coworker      0.802     -0.107      0.827     -0.869      0.000 
 
 Summary Statistics for Standardized Residuals 
 
 Smallest Standardized Residual =   -1.440 
   Median Standardized Residual =    0.000 
  Largest Standardized Residual =    1.197 
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 Stemleaf Plot 
 
-14|40  
 -12|40  
 -10|6953  
 - 8|71741  
 - 6|76511986300  
 - 4|7444885550  
 - 2|776557320  
 - 0|876665533333118886666544322211100000000000000000000  
   0|224456679923334447789  
   2|123333677890256  
   4|001123799  
   6|26803  
   8|013579  
  10|54  
  12|0 
 
                         Qplot of Standardized Residuals 
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Modification Indices and Expected Change 
 
         Modification Indices for LAMBDA-Y        
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -       2.316      1.304      1.664 
      PJ2       - -       3.762      3.073      5.120 
      PJ3       - -       0.004      0.135      0.199 
      PJ4       - -       0.382      0.056      3.125 
      PJ6       - -       0.911      0.211      1.542 
      IJ2      0.109       - -       0.053      0.007 
      IJ5       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TS2      0.006       - -        - -       2.123 
      TS3      0.005       - -        - -       0.017 
      TO1      0.249      0.495      0.942       - -  
      TO3       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TO5      0.037       - -        - -        - -  
      TO6       - -        - -        - -        - -  
 
         Expected Change for LAMBDA-Y     
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -       0.163      0.115      0.146 
      PJ2       - -      -0.296     -0.234     -0.404 
      PJ3       - -       0.006      0.035     -0.048 
      PJ4       - -       0.064      0.023      0.194 
      PJ6       - -      -0.103     -0.047     -0.137 
      IJ2      0.035       - -       0.031     -0.010 
      IJ5       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TS2      0.007       - -        - -      -0.176 
      TS3     -0.007       - -        - -       0.015 
      TO1     -0.036      0.063      0.076       - -  
      TO3       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TO5     -0.025       - -        - -        - -  
      TO6       - -        - -        - -        - -  
 
 No Non-Zero Modification Indices for LAMBDA-X     
 
         Modification Indices for BETA            
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -        - -        - -       0.132 
       IJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
       TS       - -        - -        - -       1.737 
       TO       - -        - -        - -        - -  
 
         Expected Change for BETA         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -        - -        - -       0.113 
       IJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
       TS       - -        - -        - -      -0.121 
       TO       - -        - -        - -        - -  
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         Modification Indices for GAMMA           
 
                 NFI    
            -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -  
       TS      1.094 
       TO      1.724 
 
         Expected Change for GAMMA        
 
                 NFI    
            -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -  
       TS     -0.066 
       TO     -0.104 
 
 No Non-Zero Modification Indices for PHI          
 
         Modification Indices for PSI             
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -        - -  
       TS      0.053       - -        - -  
       TO      0.337       - -       3.697       - -  
 
         Expected Change for PSI          
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -        - -  
       TS      0.015       - -        - -  
       TO      0.096       - -      -0.086       - -  
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-EPS       
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -  
      PJ2      0.261       - -  
      PJ3      2.961      7.491       - -  
      PJ4      4.475      5.902      3.117       - -  
      PJ6      2.484      2.963      1.682      0.019       - -  
      IJ2      0.052      1.228      0.404      0.093      0.880       - -  
      IJ5      4.347      1.129      2.753      2.114      3.427       - -  
      TS2      3.096      0.170      0.398      0.002      1.993      5.907 
      TS3      0.043      0.367      0.645      2.565      0.822      0.479 
      TO1      0.048      0.523      0.124      0.673      1.968      1.053 
      TO3      1.379      1.453      0.033      1.442      2.056      0.260 
      TO5      0.020      0.539      0.139      1.691      6.660      2.382 
      TO6      5.637      0.526      0.257      0.430      1.018      0.364 
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-EPS       
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5       - -  
      TS2       - -        - -  
      TS3      0.002       - -        - -  
      TO1      0.041      1.036      4.034       - -  
      TO3      0.024      0.480      0.242      2.971       - -  
      TO5      0.003      3.072      7.323       - -       3.288       - -  
      TO6      3.014      5.856      0.850      2.631      0.231      1.661 
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         Modification Indices for THETA-EPS       
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
      TO6       - -  
 
         Expected Change for THETA-EPS    
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -  
      PJ2     -0.044       - -  
      PJ3     -0.150      0.235       - -  
      PJ4      0.172     -0.199     -0.167       - -  
      PJ6     -0.124      0.151      0.110      0.010       - -  
      IJ2      0.016      0.086      0.038     -0.019     -0.065       - -  
      IJ5      0.101     -0.058     -0.070      0.066     -0.092       - -  
      TS2     -0.100      0.026      0.031     -0.002      0.082      0.294 
      TS3      0.012     -0.041      0.042     -0.090      0.056     -0.232 
      TO1      0.008     -0.030     -0.011     -0.028      0.052     -0.037 
      TO3     -0.052     -0.061     -0.007      0.050      0.065     -0.022 
      TO5     -0.005      0.030      0.012      0.044     -0.096      0.056 
      TO6      0.144      0.050     -0.027     -0.037     -0.062     -0.036 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-EPS    
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5       - -  
      TS2       - -        - -  
      TS3      0.002       - -        - -  
      TO1      0.005     -0.030      0.063       - -  
      TO3     -0.005     -0.025      0.019     -0.124       - -  
      TO5      0.001      0.052     -0.085       - -       0.081       - -  
      TO6      0.073     -0.118      0.048      0.067     -0.020     -0.054 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-EPS    
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
      TO6       - -  
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA-EPS 
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Renewal_      0.589      1.262      0.673      1.383      1.542      1.568 
 Customer      0.038      0.069      2.787      0.146      0.201      0.850 
 New_leas      0.201      0.052      0.003      1.773      2.449      0.247 
 Coworker      0.001      0.699      1.878      0.525      1.770      0.294 
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA-EPS 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Renewal_      0.772      1.503      0.595      1.455      2.835      0.523 
 Customer      4.843      3.556      0.204      0.532      0.720      1.122 
 New_leas      0.478      0.136      0.030      0.055      0.780      0.295 
 Coworker      0.718      0.928      0.902      0.014      0.203      1.557 
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA-EPS 
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
 Renewal_      1.233 
 Customer      0.778 
 New_leas      3.406 
 Coworker      4.650 
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         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA-EPS  
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Renewal_      0.108     -0.179      0.100      0.154     -0.178     -0.172 
 Customer      0.019     -0.028     -0.139      0.034      0.044     -0.086 
 New_leas      0.054     -0.031     -0.005     -0.149      0.191      0.058 
 Coworker     -0.003     -0.109      0.137      0.077     -0.156      0.061 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA-EPS  
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Renewal_     -0.086      0.140     -0.093     -0.088      0.150      0.053 
 Customer      0.146     -0.146     -0.037      0.036      0.052     -0.053 
 New_leas      0.058      0.036      0.018     -0.015     -0.067      0.034 
 Coworker      0.067     -0.090      0.094      0.007     -0.033     -0.075 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA-EPS  
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
 Renewal_     -0.135 
 Customer      0.073 
 New_leas     -0.191 
 Coworker      0.214 
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA     
 
            Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Renewal_       - -  
 Customer     10.316       - -  
 New_leas     57.421      0.068       - -  
 Coworker      0.087     13.397     15.989       - -  
 
         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA  
 
            Renewal_   Customer   New_leas   Coworker    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Renewal_       - -  
 Customer     -1.055       - -  
 New_leas      7.357      0.089       - -  
 Coworker     -0.085      0.815     -1.269       - -  
 
 Maximum Modification Index is   57.42 for Element ( 3, 1) of THETA-DELTA 
 
                           Time used 3.838 seconds 
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F2. The robust financial model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                DATE:  4/28/2015 
                                  TIME: 10:48 
 
 
                          L I S R E L  9.20 (32 Bit) 
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                         http://www.ssicentral.com 
 
        Copyright by Scientific Software International, Inc., 1981-2014 
          Use of this program is subject to the terms specified in the 
                        Universal Copyright Convention. 
 
 The following lines were read from file C:\Users\Jakob\Desktop\DATA_final\Real 
deal\FI_3.lpj: 
 
 Robust Financial Model 
 DA NI=18 NO=104 MA=CM 
 RA FI='C:\Users\Jakob\Desktop\DATA_final\Real deal\DATA_BRUK_FI_3.lsf' 
 SE 
 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 2 3 4 5 / 
 MO NX=5 NY=13 NK=1 NE=4 BE=FU,FI GA=FU,FI PS=SY,FR TE=DI,FR TD=DI,FR 
 
 
 
 MO NX=5 NY=13 NK=1 NE=4 BE=FU,FI GA=FU,FI PS=SY,FR TE=DI,FR TD=DI,FR 
 LE 
 PJ IJ TS TO 
 LK 
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 FI 
 FR LY(1,1) LY(2,1) LY(3,1) LY(4,1) LY(5,1) LY(6,2) LY(7,2) LY(8,3) LY(9,3) 
 FR LY(10,4) LY(11,4) LY(12,4) LY(13,4) LX(1,1) LX(2,1) LX(3,1) LX(4,1) LX(5,1) 
 FR BE(3,1) BE(3,2) BE(4,1) BE(4,2) GA(1,1) GA(2,1) 
 FI PS(1,3) PS(1,4) PS(2,3) PS(2,4) PS(3,4) 
 PD 
 RO 
 OU MI RS FT 
 
 Robust Financial Model                                                          
 
                           Number of Input Variables 18 
                           Number of Y - Variables   13 
                           Number of X - Variables    5 
                           Number of ETA - Variables  4 
                           Number of KSI - Variables  1 
                           Number of Observations   104 
 Robust Financial Model                                                          
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      1.671 
      PJ2      0.964      1.768 
      PJ3      1.220      1.286      1.881 
      PJ4      1.220      0.958      1.337      1.738 
      PJ6      1.034      1.148      1.366      1.209      1.804 
      IJ2      0.871      0.662      0.935      0.844      0.688      1.963 
      IJ5      0.853      0.510      0.811      0.826      0.624      1.295 
      TS2      0.764      0.569      0.914      0.811      0.786      1.541 
      TS3      0.914      0.583      1.007      0.848      0.841      1.661 
      TO1      0.938      0.659      0.997      1.003      0.839      1.102 
      TO3      0.821      0.580      0.920      0.971      0.798      0.958 
      TO5      0.936      0.700      1.013      1.046      0.763      1.141 
      TO6      0.858      0.586      0.780      0.777      0.597      0.807 
 Manageme      0.211     -0.066      0.202      0.208      0.125      0.162 
 Interest      0.304      0.324      0.378      0.344      0.370     -0.016 
 Operatin      0.529      0.196      0.497      0.389      0.154     -0.045 
      ROI      0.391     -0.086      0.281      0.448     -0.143      0.085 
 Adm.cost      0.411      0.248      0.391      0.304      0.217      0.278 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      1.483 
      TS2      1.421      2.077 
      TS3      1.575      1.945      2.481 
      TO1      1.113      1.116      1.330      1.621 
      TO3      0.963      0.952      1.130      1.341      1.455 
      TO5      1.101      1.127      1.243      1.496      1.358      1.621 
      TO6      0.873      0.733      0.968      1.162      1.010      1.119 
 Manageme      0.223      0.016      0.098      0.233      0.298      0.204 
 Interest     -0.140     -0.029     -0.197     -0.563     -0.360     -0.360 
 Operatin      0.095     -0.069     -0.178      0.183      0.118      0.215 
      ROI      0.107      0.190      0.088      0.053      0.037      0.103 
 Adm.cost      0.034     -0.020      0.100     -0.191     -0.105     -0.071 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
                 TO6   Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      1.369 
 Manageme      0.258      1.954 
 Interest     -0.432      1.110      6.504 
 Operatin      0.174      1.450      2.418      3.358 
      ROI      0.018      1.541      2.528      2.167      3.788 
 Adm.cost     -0.100      1.497      3.943      2.144      2.622      4.697 
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 Total Variance = 43.233 Generalized Variance = 0.0658                                   
 
 Largest Eigenvalue = 14.473 Smallest Eigenvalue = 0.093                                    
 
 Condition Number = 12.480 
 
 Parameter Specifications 
         LAMBDA-Y     
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO 
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1          0          0          0          0 
      PJ2          1          0          0          0 
      PJ3          2          0          0          0 
      PJ4          3          0          0          0 
      PJ6          4          0          0          0 
      IJ2          0          0          0          0 
      IJ5          0          5          0          0 
      TS2          0          0          0          0 
      TS3          0          0          6          0 
      TO1          0          0          0          0 
      TO3          0          0          0          7 
      TO5          0          0          0          8 
      TO6          0          0          0          9 
 
         LAMBDA-X     
 
                  FI 
            -------- 
 Manageme         10 
 Interest         11 
 Operatin         12 
      ROI         13 
 Adm.cost         14 
 
         BETA         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO 
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ          0          0          0          0 
       IJ          0          0          0          0 
       TS         15         16          0          0 
       TO         17         18          0          0 
 
         GAMMA        
 
                  FI 
            -------- 
       PJ         19 
       IJ         20 
       TS          0 
       TO          0 
         PSI          
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO 
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ         21 
       IJ         22         23 
       TS          0          0         24 
       TO          0          0          0         25 
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2 
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
                  26         27         28         29         30         31 
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         THETA-EPS    
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5 
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
                  32         33         34         35         36         37 
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 TO6 
            -------- 
                  38 
 
         THETA-DELTA  
 
            Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost 
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
                  39         40         41         42         43 
 
 
 
 Number of Iterations = 13           
 
 LISREL Estimates (Robust Maximum Likelihood)                     
 
         LAMBDA-Y     
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      1.027       - -        - -        - -  
  
      PJ2      0.969       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.128) 
               7.564 
  
      PJ3      1.232       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.103) 
              11.982 
  
      PJ4      1.113       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.105) 
              10.605 
  
      PJ6      1.079       - -        - -        - -  
             (0.113) 
               9.552 
  
      IJ2       - -       1.178       - -        - -  
  
      IJ5       - -       1.120       - -        - -  
                        (0.102) 
                         11.030 
  
      TS2       - -        - -       1.325       - -  
  
      TS3       - -        - -       1.467       - -  
                                   (0.092) 
                                    16.018 
  
      TO1       - -        - -        - -       1.225 
  
      TO3       - -        - -        - -       1.100 
                                              (0.081) 
                                               13.508 
  
      TO5       - -        - -        - -       1.223 
                                              (0.059) 
                                               20.859 
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      TO6       - -        - -        - -       0.930 
                                              (0.128) 
                                                7.256 
  
         LAMBDA-X     
 
                  FI    
            -------- 
 Manageme      0.883 
             (0.175) 
               5.052 
  
 Interest      1.859 
             (0.213) 
               8.739 
  
 Operatin      1.345 
             (0.185) 
               7.251 
  
      ROI      1.508 
             (0.189) 
               7.959 
  
 Adm.cost      1.790 
             (0.128) 
              13.953 
  
         BETA         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
  
       IJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
  
       TS     -0.080      1.007       - -        - -  
             (0.060)    (0.092) 
              -1.346     10.995 
  
       TO      0.332      0.570       - -        - -  
             (0.084)    (0.131) 
               3.933      4.361 
  
 
         GAMMA        
 
                  FI    
            -------- 
       PJ      0.169 
             (0.126) 
               1.343 
  
       IJ      0.027 
             (0.137) 
               0.199 
  
       TS       - -  
  
       TO       - -  
  
 
  
99 
 
         Covariance Matrix of ETA and KSI         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO         FI    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ      1.000 
       IJ      0.615      1.000 
       TS      0.538      0.957      1.000 
       TO      0.683      0.774      0.725      1.000 
       FI      0.169      0.027      0.014      0.072      1.000 
 
         PHI          
 
                  FI    
            -------- 
               1.000 
  
 
         PSI          
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ      0.971 
             (0.236) 
               4.115 
  
       IJ      0.610      0.999 
             (0.188)    (0.247) 
               3.241      4.038 
  
       TS       - -        - -       0.079 
                                   (0.045) 
                                     1.762 
  
       TO       - -        - -        - -       0.332 
                                              (0.088) 
                                                3.792 
  
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Equations   
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.029      0.001      0.921      0.668 
 
 NOTE: R² for Structural Equatios are Hayduk's (2006) Blocked-Error R² 
 
         Reduced Form                 
 
                  FI    
            -------- 
       PJ      0.169 
             (0.126) 
               1.336 
  
       IJ      0.027 
             (0.138) 
               0.198 
  
       TS      0.014 
             (0.134) 
               0.104 
  
       TO      0.072 
             (0.110) 
               0.649 
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         Squared Multiple Correlations for Reduced Form           
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.029      0.001      0.000      0.005 
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.617      0.829      0.364      0.499      0.640      0.576 
             (0.134)    (0.170)    (0.080)    (0.102)    (0.134)    (0.323) 
               4.619      4.878      4.523      4.872      4.768      1.785 
  
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.228      0.321      0.328      0.121      0.244      0.124 
             (0.050)    (0.094)    (0.104)    (0.039)    (0.057)    (0.037) 
               4.540      3.399      3.162      3.090      4.308      3.396 
  
 
         THETA-EPS    
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
               0.503 
             (0.127) 
               3.972 
  
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Y - Variables          
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.631      0.531      0.807      0.713      0.645      0.707 
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Y - Variables          
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.846      0.846      0.868      0.925      0.832      0.923 
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for Y - Variables          
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
               0.632 
 
         THETA-DELTA  
 
            Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               1.173      3.047      1.549      1.515      1.492 
             (0.233)    (0.640)    (0.328)    (0.257)    (0.307) 
               5.028      4.761      4.726      5.894      4.854 
  
 
         Squared Multiple Correlations for X - Variables          
 
            Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
               0.399      0.531      0.539      0.600      0.682 
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                                 Log-likelihood Values 
 
                        Estimated Model          Saturated Model 
                        ---------------          --------------- 
 Number of free parameters(t)        43                      171 
 -2ln(L)                       1783.060                 1588.990 
 AIC (Akaike, 1974)*           1869.060                 1930.990 
 BIC (Schwarz, 1978)*          1982.768                 2383.181 
 
*LISREL uses AIC= 2t - 2ln(L) and BIC = tln(N)- 2ln(L) 
 
 
                           Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
 
 Degrees of Freedom for (C1)-(C3)                      128 
 Maximum Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square (C1)              194.070 (P = 0.0001) 
 Browne's (1984) ADF Chi-Square (C2_NT)                200.685 (P = 0.0000) 
 Satorra-Bentler (1988) Scaled Chi-Square (C3)         162.675 (P = 0.0208) 
 Satorra-Bentler (1988) Adjusted Chi-Square (C4)       30.931 (P = 0.1673) 
 Degrees of Freedom for C4                             24.338 
  
 Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP)              66.070 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP                (32.481 ; 107.622) 
  
 Minimum Fit Function Value                            1.866 
 Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0)            0.635 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0                 (0.312 ; 1.035) 
 Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)       0.0704 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA              (0.0494 ; 0.0899) 
 P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05)          0.0545 
  
 Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI)                2.693 
 90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI               (2.370 ; 3.093) 
 ECVI for Saturated Model                              3.288 
 ECVI for Independence Model                           16.921 
  
 Chi-Square for Independence Model (153 df)        1723.739 
  
 Normed Fit Index (NFI)                                0.887 
 Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI)                           0.950 
 Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI)                     0.742 
 Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                           0.958 
 Incremental Fit Index (IFI)                           0.959 
 Relative Fit Index (RFI)                              0.865 
  
 Critical N (CN)                                      90.235 
  
  
 Root Mean Square Residual (RMR)                       0.155 
 Standardized RMR                                      0.0589 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)                           0.823 
 Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)                 0.764 
 Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI)                0.616 
 
  
102 
 
 Robust Financial Model                                                          
 
         Fitted Covariance Matrix 
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      1.671 
      PJ2      0.995      1.768 
      PJ3      1.265      1.194      1.881 
      PJ4      1.143      1.079      1.371      1.738 
      PJ6      1.108      1.046      1.329      1.201      1.804 
      IJ2      0.743      0.702      0.892      0.806      0.781      1.963 
      IJ5      0.707      0.667      0.848      0.766      0.743      1.319 
      TS2      0.732      0.692      0.879      0.794      0.770      1.495 
      TS3      0.811      0.766      0.973      0.879      0.852      1.655 
      TO1      0.858      0.810      1.030      0.931      0.902      1.117 
      TO3      0.771      0.728      0.925      0.836      0.811      1.004 
      TO5      0.857      0.809      1.028      0.929      0.901      1.115 
      TO6      0.652      0.616      0.782      0.707      0.685      0.848 
 Manageme      0.153      0.145      0.184      0.166      0.161      0.028 
 Interest      0.322      0.304      0.387      0.349      0.339      0.060 
 Operatin      0.233      0.220      0.280      0.253      0.245      0.043 
      ROI      0.261      0.247      0.314      0.283      0.275      0.048 
 Adm.cost      0.310      0.293      0.372      0.336      0.326      0.058 
 
         Fitted Covariance Matrix 
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      1.483 
      TS2      1.421      2.077 
      TS3      1.574      1.945      2.481 
      TO1      1.062      1.176      1.302      1.621 
      TO3      0.954      1.057      1.170      1.348      1.455 
      TO5      1.061      1.175      1.301      1.498      1.346      1.621 
      TO6      0.807      0.893      0.989      1.139      1.024      1.138 
 Manageme      0.027      0.016      0.018      0.078      0.070      0.077 
 Interest      0.057      0.034      0.038      0.163      0.147      0.163 
 Operatin      0.041      0.025      0.027      0.118      0.106      0.118 
      ROI      0.046      0.028      0.031      0.132      0.119      0.132 
 Adm.cost      0.055      0.033      0.037      0.157      0.141      0.157 
 
         Fitted Covariance Matrix 
 
                 TO6   Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      1.369 
 Manageme      0.059      1.954 
 Interest      0.124      1.642      6.504 
 Operatin      0.090      1.188      2.501      3.358 
      ROI      0.101      1.332      2.803      2.028      3.788 
 Adm.cost      0.119      1.581      3.328      2.407      2.699      4.697 
 
         Fitted Residuals 
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      0.000 
      PJ2     -0.031      0.000 
      PJ3     -0.044      0.092      0.000 
      PJ4      0.077     -0.121     -0.034      0.000 
      PJ6     -0.074      0.102      0.037      0.008      0.000 
      IJ2      0.128     -0.039      0.044      0.038     -0.093      0.000 
      IJ5      0.146     -0.157     -0.037      0.059     -0.118     -0.024 
      TS2      0.032     -0.122      0.035      0.017      0.016      0.046 
      TS3      0.103     -0.182      0.034     -0.031     -0.011      0.007 
      TO1      0.080     -0.151     -0.033      0.072     -0.063     -0.015 
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      TO3      0.050     -0.148     -0.005      0.134     -0.013     -0.046 
      TO5      0.079     -0.110     -0.015      0.116     -0.138      0.025 
      TO6      0.206     -0.030     -0.003      0.070     -0.088     -0.042 
 Manageme      0.058     -0.210      0.018      0.042     -0.036      0.134 
 Interest     -0.019      0.020     -0.009     -0.005      0.031     -0.076 
 Operatin      0.296     -0.024      0.217      0.136     -0.091     -0.088 
      ROI      0.130     -0.333     -0.032      0.165     -0.418      0.036 
 Adm.cost      0.101     -0.045      0.018     -0.033     -0.110      0.221 
 
         Fitted Residuals 
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      0.000 
      TS2      0.000      0.000 
      TS3      0.002      0.000      0.000 
      TO1      0.051     -0.060      0.028      0.000 
      TO3      0.009     -0.105     -0.040     -0.007      0.000 
      TO5      0.040     -0.048     -0.058     -0.002      0.012      0.000 
      TO6      0.067     -0.161     -0.022      0.023     -0.014     -0.019 
 Manageme      0.196      0.000      0.080      0.156      0.228      0.126 
 Interest     -0.197     -0.063     -0.235     -0.726     -0.507     -0.523 
 Operatin      0.054     -0.093     -0.206      0.065      0.012      0.097 
      ROI      0.061      0.163      0.057     -0.080     -0.082     -0.029 
 Adm.cost     -0.021     -0.053      0.063     -0.348     -0.246     -0.228 
 
         Fitted Residuals 
 
                 TO6   Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      0.000 
 Manageme      0.199      0.000 
 Interest     -0.556     -0.532      0.000 
 Operatin      0.085      0.262     -0.082      0.000 
      ROI     -0.083      0.209     -0.275      0.140      0.000 
 Adm.cost     -0.219     -0.084      0.614     -0.264     -0.077      0.000 
 
  
Summary Statistics for Fitted Residuals 
 
 Smallest Fitted Residual =   -0.726 
   Median Fitted Residual =    0.000 
  Largest Fitted Residual =    0.614 
 
 Stemleaf Plot 
 
 - 7|3  
 - 6|  
 - 5|6321  
 - 4|2  
 - 3|53  
 - 2|865432110  
 - 1|866554222110  
 - 0|99999888888876666555544444433333333222222211111100000000000000000000000000  
   0|111112222223333334444445555666667777888889  
   1|0000233333445667  
   2|00112236  
   3|0  
   4|  
   5|  
   6|1 
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         Standardized Residuals   
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1      0.000 
      PJ2     -0.127      0.000 
      PJ3     -0.186      0.398      0.000 
      PJ4      0.317     -0.574     -0.148      0.000 
      PJ6     -0.344      0.474      0.163      0.035      0.000 
      IJ2      0.515     -0.172      0.179      0.138     -0.395      0.000 
      IJ5      0.588     -0.719     -0.158      0.214     -0.657     -0.070 
      TS2      0.182     -0.593      0.166      0.055      0.065      0.125 
      TS3      0.516     -0.976      0.286     -0.133     -0.054      0.020 
      TO1      0.270     -0.725     -0.131      0.261     -0.291     -0.043 
      TO3      0.229     -0.765     -0.023      0.564     -0.068     -0.159 
      TO5      0.287     -0.448     -0.060      0.426     -0.591      0.075 
      TO6      0.881     -0.200     -0.013      0.341     -0.470     -0.131 
 Manageme      0.209     -1.239      0.071      0.164     -0.176      0.534 
 Interest     -0.061      0.058     -0.027     -0.016      0.105     -0.228 
 Operatin      1.298     -0.499      0.825      0.551     -0.344     -0.349 
      ROI      0.459     -1.414     -0.113      0.611     -1.462      0.130 
 Adm.cost      0.366     -0.212      0.058     -0.121     -0.387      0.717 
 
         Standardized Residuals   
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5      0.000 
      TS2      0.000      0.000 
      TS3      0.005      0.000      0.000 
      TO1      0.137     -0.170      0.077      0.000 
      TO3      0.027     -0.354     -0.126     -0.021      0.000 
      TO5      0.120     -0.148     -0.156     -0.005      0.039      0.000 
      TO6      0.180     -0.493     -0.066      0.061     -0.043     -0.052 
 Manageme      0.647      0.000      0.247      0.503      0.753      0.421 
 Interest     -0.738     -0.165     -0.614     -2.422     -1.920     -1.698 
 Operatin      0.198     -0.341     -0.594      0.206      0.038      0.308 
      ROI      0.197      0.559      0.166     -0.251     -0.269     -0.089 
 Adm.cost     -0.076     -0.168      0.169     -1.209     -1.113     -1.199 
 
         Standardized Residuals   
 
                 TO6   Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      TO6      0.000 
 Manageme      0.637      0.000 
 Interest     -1.969       - -       0.000 
 Operatin      0.274      0.629     -0.180      0.000 
      ROI     -0.266      0.508     -0.577      0.283      0.000 
 Adm.cost     -0.827     -0.245      1.321     -0.691     -0.180      0.000 
 
 Summary Statistics for Standardized Residuals 
 
 Smallest Standardized Residual =   -2.422 
   Median Standardized Residual =    0.000 
  Largest Standardized Residual =    1.321  
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 Stemleaf Plot 
 -24|2  
 -22|  
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 Modification Indices and Expected Change 
 
         Modification Indices for LAMBDA-Y        
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -       2.213      1.274      1.653 
      PJ2       - -       3.664      3.059      5.070 
      PJ3       - -       0.003      0.123      0.206 
      PJ4       - -       0.353      0.052      3.137 
      PJ6       - -       0.810      0.188      1.444 
      IJ2      0.110       - -       0.037      0.012 
      IJ5       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TS2      0.007       - -        - -       2.171 
      TS3      0.007       - -        - -       0.008 
      TO1      0.266      0.520      0.943       - -  
      TO3       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TO5      0.016       - -        - -        - -  
      TO6       - -        - -        - -        - -  
 
         Expected Change for LAMBDA-Y     
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -       0.160      0.114      0.145 
      PJ2       - -      -0.291     -0.233     -0.398 
      PJ3       - -       0.005      0.034     -0.049 
      PJ4       - -       0.062      0.022      0.195 
      PJ6       - -      -0.097     -0.045     -0.133 
      IJ2      0.035       - -       0.025     -0.013 
      IJ5       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TS2      0.008       - -        - -      -0.175 
      TS3     -0.008       - -        - -       0.011 
      TO1     -0.037      0.065      0.076       - -  
      TO3       - -        - -        - -        - -  
      TO5     -0.017       - -        - -        - -  
      TO6       - -        - -        - -        - -  
 
 No Non-Zero Modification Indices for LAMBDA-X     
 
         Modification Indices for BETA            
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -        - -        - -       0.285 
       IJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
       TS       - -        - -        - -       1.977 
       TO       - -        - -        - -        - -  
 
         Expected Change for BETA         
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -        - -        - -       0.187 
       IJ       - -        - -        - -        - -  
       TS       - -        - -        - -      -0.129 
       TO       - -        - -        - -        - -  
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         Modification Indices for GAMMA           
 
                  FI    
            -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -  
       TS      0.070 
       TO      1.517 
 
         Expected Change for GAMMA        
 
                  FI    
            -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -  
       TS     -0.015 
       TO     -0.084 
 
 No Non-Zero Modification Indices for PHI          
 
         Modification Indices for PSI             
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -        - -  
       TS      0.006       - -        - -  
       TO      0.448       - -       4.402       - -  
 
         Expected Change for PSI          
 
                  PJ         IJ         TS         TO    
            --------   --------   --------   -------- 
       PJ       - -  
       IJ       - -        - -  
       TS      0.005       - -        - -  
       TO      0.097       - -      -0.095       - -  
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-EPS       
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -  
      PJ2      0.287       - -  
      PJ3      3.219      7.318       - -  
      PJ4      4.360      6.049      3.462       - -  
      PJ6      2.331      3.017      1.908      0.038       - -  
      IJ2      0.054      1.101      0.324      0.106      1.002       - -  
      IJ5      4.649      1.181      2.531      2.290      3.364       - -  
      TS2      3.081      0.141      0.379      0.002      1.907      5.903 
      TS3      0.055      0.398      0.678      2.515      0.803       - -  
      TO1      0.058      0.512      0.106      0.634      1.997      1.108 
      TO3      1.319      1.417      0.020      1.521      2.110      0.258 
      TO5      0.028      0.498      0.102      1.607      6.745      2.383 
      TO6      5.616      0.516      0.273      0.441      1.019      0.359 
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Modification Indices for THETA-EPS       
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5       - -  
      TS2       - -        - -  
      TS3      0.007       - -        - -  
      TO1      0.035      1.072      3.966       - -  
      TO3      0.018      0.478      0.245      2.848       - -  
      TO5      0.005      3.036      7.366       - -       3.287       - -  
      TO6      2.961      5.880      0.840      2.631      0.229      1.666 
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-EPS       
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
      TO6       - -  
 
         Expected Change for THETA-EPS    
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      PJ1       - -  
      PJ2     -0.046       - -  
      PJ3     -0.158      0.233       - -  
      PJ4      0.169     -0.201     -0.178       - -  
      PJ6     -0.120      0.152      0.117      0.015       - -  
      IJ2      0.016      0.081      0.034     -0.021     -0.070       - -  
      IJ5      0.105     -0.060     -0.068      0.069     -0.091       - -  
      TS2     -0.099      0.024      0.030     -0.003      0.080      0.304 
      TS3      0.014     -0.043      0.043     -0.089      0.055       - -  
      TO1      0.009     -0.029     -0.010     -0.027      0.052     -0.038 
      TO3     -0.051     -0.060     -0.005      0.051      0.066     -0.022 
      TO5     -0.006      0.029      0.010      0.043     -0.097      0.056 
      TO6      0.143      0.049     -0.027     -0.037     -0.062     -0.035 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-EPS    
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      IJ5       - -  
      TS2       - -        - -  
      TS3      0.005       - -        - -  
      TO1      0.005     -0.031      0.062       - -  
      TO3     -0.004     -0.025      0.019     -0.120       - -  
      TO5      0.002      0.052     -0.085       - -       0.081       - -  
      TO6      0.072     -0.119      0.048      0.067     -0.020     -0.054 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-EPS    
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
      TO6       - -  
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA-EPS 
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Manageme      0.040      3.213      0.114      0.001      0.100      0.043 
 Interest      0.791      1.927      0.001      0.052      3.782      0.138 
 Operatin      1.247      0.115      0.853      0.185      1.333      1.952 
      ROI      0.931      3.553      0.022      5.866      8.889      0.854 
 Adm.cost      0.000      1.334      0.002      1.180      0.658      4.697 
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         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA-EPS 
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Manageme      3.337      3.337      0.010      0.693      3.503      2.221 
 Interest      0.550      2.152      0.064      4.525      0.042      0.445 
 Operatin      1.933      0.006      2.955      1.363      0.862      0.118 
      ROI      0.042      2.300      0.104      0.505      0.352      0.060 
 Adm.cost      1.310      1.620      2.941      1.423      0.036      0.109 
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA-EPS 
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
 Manageme      1.417 
 Interest      0.951 
 Operatin      0.263 
      ROI      0.179 
 Adm.cost      0.024 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA-EPS  
 
                 PJ1        PJ2        PJ3        PJ4        PJ6        IJ2    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Manageme     -0.019     -0.191     -0.027     -0.002      0.031     -0.019 
 Interest     -0.140      0.246     -0.004     -0.033      0.312      0.057 
 Operatin      0.125     -0.043      0.090     -0.045     -0.133     -0.153 
      ROI      0.110     -0.243     -0.015      0.257     -0.348     -0.103 
 Adm.cost      0.000      0.156      0.004     -0.121      0.099      0.253 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA-EPS  
 
                 IJ5        TS2        TS3        TO1        TO3        TO5    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Manageme      0.119     -0.139     -0.008      0.041      0.112     -0.073 
 Interest     -0.081      0.186     -0.034     -0.173      0.020      0.055 
 Operatin      0.108     -0.007     -0.165      0.068     -0.066      0.020 
      ROI     -0.016      0.140     -0.031      0.042     -0.043      0.015 
 Adm.cost     -0.095     -0.123      0.176     -0.074     -0.014      0.021 
 
         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA-EPS  
 
                 TO6    
            -------- 
 Manageme      0.097 
 Interest     -0.132 
 Operatin      0.050 
      ROI     -0.042 
 Adm.cost     -0.016 
 
         Modification Indices for THETA-DELTA     
 
            Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Manageme       - -  
 Interest     13.771       - -  
 Operatin      6.454      0.345       - -  
      ROI      4.207      3.814      2.112       - -  
 Adm.cost      0.816     44.301      8.891      1.167       - -  
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         Expected Change for THETA-DELTA  
 
            Manageme   Interest   Operatin        ROI   Adm.cost    
            --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 Manageme       - -  
 Interest     -0.898       - -  
 Operatin      0.435     -0.192       - -  
      ROI      0.347     -0.621      0.345       - -  
 Adm.cost     -0.164      3.184     -0.757     -0.332       - -  
 
 Maximum Modification Index is   44.30 for Element ( 5, 2) of THETA-DELTA 
 
                           Time used 6.053 seconds 
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F3. Path diagram (standardized values and T-values) of model with direct effect of trust in 
superior on trust in organization.   
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F4. Path diagram (standardized values and T-values) of model with reversed effect of trust in 
superior on interactional justice (i.e. TS  IJ). Structural model for clarity. 
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F5. Path diagram (standardized values and T-values) of model with KPIs according to 
organizational strategy. The latent variable “development through investment” reflects the 
organization’s green vision, with return and expenses related to accompanying investment. 
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Appendix G – Calculation of composite reliability and average variance 
extracted 
 
G1. Calculation of composite reliability measure. Calculated based on standardized estimates25: 
𝜌𝑐 =
(∑ 𝜆𝑖)
2𝑟
𝑖
(∑ 𝜆𝑖)2 + ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛿𝑖)
𝑟
𝑖
𝑟
𝑖
 
NFI: 
𝜌𝑐 =
(0.64 + 0.62 + 0.71 + 0.55)2
(0.64 + 0.62 + 0.71 + 0.55)2 + (0.60 + 0.61 + 0.50 + 0.70)
= 0.725 
FI: 
𝜌𝑐 =
(0.63 + 0.73 + 0.73 + 0.77 + 0.83)2
(0.63 + 0.73 + 0.73 + 0.77 + 0.83)2 + (0.60 + 0.47 + 0.46 + 0.40 + 0.32)
= 0.855 
PJ: 
𝜌𝑐 =
(0.73 + 0.90 + 0.84 + 0.81)2
(0.73 + 0.90 + 0.84 + 0.81)2 + (0.47 + 0.19 + 0.29 + 0.35)
= 0.892 
IJ: 
𝜌𝑐 =
(0.92)2
(0.92)2 + (0.15)
= 0.849 
TS: 
𝜌𝑐 =
(0.93)2
(0.93)2 + (0.13)
= 0.869 
TO: 
𝜌𝑐 =
(0.91 + 0.96 + 0.80)2
(0.91 + 0.96 + 0.80)2 + (0.17 + 0.08 + 0.37)
= 0.920 
  
                                                 
25 CR calculation of PJ, IJ, TS and TO is calculated with the non-financial model estimates. The estimates between 
the non-financial and financial models are almost equivalent, yielding the same conclusion. 
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G2. Calculation of average variance extracted. Calculated based on standardized estimates26: 
𝜌𝑐 =
∑ 𝜆𝑖
2𝑟
𝑖
∑ 𝜆𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛿𝑖)
𝑟
𝑖
𝑟
𝑖
 
NFI: 
𝜌𝑐 =
0.642 + 0.622 + 0.712 + 0.552
0.642 + 0.622 + 0.712 + 0.552 + (0.60 + 0.61 + 0.50 + 0.70)
= 0.399 
FI: 
𝜌𝑐 =
0.632 + 0.732 + 0.732 + 0.772 + 0.832
0.632 + 0.732 + 0.732 + 0.772 + 0.832 + (0.60 + 0.47 + 0.46 + 0.40 + 0.32)
= 0.550 
PJ: 
𝜌𝑐 =
0.732 + 0.902 + 0.842 + 0.812
0.732 + 0.902 + 0.842 + 0.812 + (0.47 + 0.19 + 0.29 + 0.35)
= 0.675 
IJ: 
𝜌𝑐 =
0.922
0.922 + (0.15)
= 0.849 
TS: 
𝜌𝑐 =
0.932
0.932 + (0.13)
= 0.869 
TO: 
𝜌𝑐 =
0.912 + 0.962 + 0.802
0.912 + 0.962 + 0.802 + (0.17 + 0.08 + 0.37)
= 0.794 
                                                 
26 AVE calculation of PJ, IJ, TS and TO is calculated with the non-financial model estimates. The estimates 
between the non-financial and financial models are almost equivalent, yielding the same conclusion. 
